HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
VOLUME XLVIII APRIL, 1955 NUMBER 2

THE AMBIVALENCE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS' VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIVINE LAW TO HUMAN LAW

JANE E. RUBY
WHEATON COLLEGE, NORTON, MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE ARTICLE of the Summa theologica on the question "whether infidels can have dominion and rule over Christians" (II–ii, q. 10, a. 10), St. Thomas says:

> Dominion and rule are based on human law; the distinction between Christian and infidel springs from divine law. But divine law, which is founded in grace, does not destroy human law, which stems from natural reason. Therefore, the distinction between Christian and infidel does not, considered in itself, destroy the dominion and rule of infidels over Christians.[1]

In interpretations of the Article this passage is frequently much stressed and occasionally even treated as the sum and substance of St. Thomas' position. It is, however, unjustifiable to regard it as his answer to the question, or even as the principal contention of the Article. Strong as may have been St. Thomas' desire to preserve inviolate the human law of dominion, even stronger was his conviction that infidels do not rightly rule Christians; and despite the categorical ring of the statement on the laws, in the positive provisions of the Article divine law does destroy human law.

There are two other Articles of the Summa in which St. Thomas deals with questions of infidel dominion. In the one, "Whether

[1] Opera omnia (Rome, 1882–), VIII, 91–92: Ubi considerandum est quod dominium et praelatio introducta sunt ex iure humano: distinctio autem fidelium et infidelium est ex iure divino. Ius autem divinum, quod est ex gratia, non tollit ius humanum, quod est ex naturali ratione. Et ideo distinctio fidelium et infidelium, secundum se considerata, non tollit dominium et praelationem infidelium supra fideles.

there can be forcible seizure without sin" (II–ii, q. 66, a. 8), his answer entails no conflict between divine law and human law, because divine law is, *ab initio*, not involved. In the other, "Whether on account of apostasy from the faith a ruler loses his dominion over his subjects, so that they are released from obedience to him" (II–ii, q. 12, a. 2) — in which St. Thomas again says that human law is not destroyed by divine law — he seems to intend that the Church's destruction of the rule of apostates stems from a positive law applicable alike to secular and spiritual cases, and that divine law as such therefore has no rôle in the destruction. To the question of infidel dominion over Christians, however, this solution is not applicable; and the conflict of the laws, although half obscured, is unquestionably present.

St. Thomas begins by saying that the Church can never permit the new establishment of infidel dominion over Christians. "For that," he explains, "leads to scandal and to endangering of faith, because those under the jurisdiction of others, unless they are of great strength, can easily be influenced by those to whom they are subject, and what is more, infidels would despise the faith if they knew the defections of believers."

Then, turning to the question of already existing dominion, he makes the statement on the relationship of dominion to the laws, only to continue:

> However, such right of dominion or rule can justly be destroyed by sentence or decree of the Church, which is invested with the authority of God, because infidels, in virtue of their infidelity, deserve to lose their power over Christians, who are transferred to the children of God.[2] However, the Church sometimes does this, and sometimes does not.[3]

In his explanation he makes it clear that the right of the Church to issue such a sentence or decree is unlimited. He says that in the case of those infidels who are subject to the Church in temporal matters, the Church has taken action. It has established the

[2] This departure from the customary translation, "who were becoming the children of God," will be justified farther on.

[3] Potest tamen iuste per sententiam vel ordinationem Ecclesiae, auctoritatem Dei habentis, tale ius dominii vel praelationis tolli: quia infideles merito suae infidelitatis merentur potestatem amittere super fideles, qui transferuntur in filios Dei. Sed hoc quidem Ecclesia quandoque facit, quandoque autem non facit. (P. 92.)

law that Jews, who are slaves of the Church, shall lose their dominion over any slaves who become Christians. If, in the case of those infidels not subject in temporal matters, the Church has not established such a law even though it has the right to do so (licet posset instituere de iure), it is in order to avoid scandal that it has refrained from action. Thus Christ paid tribute, although he could have excused himself from it.

In answer to the first objection — that according to I Tim. vi, 1, Christians should serve infidel masters — he simply refers one to the body of the Article. In reply to the second — that according to Phil. iv, 22, Christians were members of Nero's household — he explains that the rule of Nero pre-existed the distinction between infidels and Christians and so was not dissolved by conversions to the faith, and that, besides, it was useful to have some Christians in the Imperial household, so that they could protect the faithful. A third objection — that Christians can be subject to infidels, because they can be their *coloni* — he answers by saying it is more dangerous for Christians to be subject to the dominion or rule of infidels than for them to aid infidels in some particular art, and therefore the Church permits them to cultivate the lands of Jews, since in doing so they need not necessarily converse with the Jews; but if from such communication or association subversion of faith is to be feared, it is absolutely to be forbidden.

Clearly, the principal contention of the Article is that because infidel dominion over Christians endangers salvation it can be destroyed or prevented by the Church. The statement that "the distinction between Christian and infidel does not destroy the dominion and rule of infidels over Christians," qualified as it is by the phrase "considered in itself," means merely that it does not destroy it unless the Church takes action. But the Church has the right to act in all cases, and in acting it executes divine law, for, as St. Thomas says elsewhere, "those things which are necessary to salvation fall under the precepts of divine law,"[4] and it is quite evident that it is because subjection to infidel dominion endangers salvation that he says here that infidels "deserve to lose their power over Christians."

[4] Summa theologica, II–ii, q. 3, a. 2. Cf. II–i, q. 91, a. 4; Quodl. XII, a. 25, ad 1.

Yet, in spite of this, St. Thomas says that divine law does not destroy human law. To be sure, since the Church does in practice refrain from action except in the case of those infidels subject to it in temporal matters, an accommodation of the parts of the Article is possible — but only if one understands the "human law" of the statement simply as part of the civil law, which each state enacts for itself, and only, too, if one take the statement not as an assertion of principle but as a description of practice. Such interpretation, however, is not satisfactory. One cannot, of course, make much of the fact that the statement has all the air of an assertion of principle; but when one realizes that the human law on which dominion and rule are based is more than civil law, one must come to the conclusion that it is only through ambiguity that the unity of the Article is saved.

In this Article St. Thomas does not specify the kind of human law from which dominion and rule spring; but when he reiterates the statement on laws in the Article on apostate rulers, he does. He says:

> I answer that, as is said above, infidelity is not in itself incompatible with dominion, because dominion is introduced by the *iure gentium*, which is human law, and the distinction between infidel and Christian depends on divine law, which does not destroy human law.[5]

It follows that, even in acting where it has the power of civil law, the Church is violating human law, for, implementing divine law, it destroys the dominion of infidels presumably qualified for it in terms of the *ius gentium*. Similarly, although to prevent dominion is not to destroy it, in preventing new institution of infidel dominion over Christians, the Church destroys human law through divine law by disqualifying those the *ius gentium* qualifies.

One of St. Thomas' most familiar assertions is that grace does not destroy nature.[6] Yet, to destroy a part of the *ius gentium*

[5] II–ii, q. 12, a. 2 (Opera omnia [Rome, 1882–], VIII, 105): Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, infidelitas secundum seipsam non repugnat dominio, eo quod dominium introductum est de iure gentium, quod est ius humanum; distinctio autem fidelium et infidelium est secundum ius divinum, per quod non tollitur ius humanum.

Cf. II–ii, q. 57, a. 3 ad 2 on mastery over slaves; II–i, q. 95, a. 4, together with I, q. 96, a. 4, on political rule.

[6] ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

comes very close to destroying natural law. The *ius gentium*, he says, is derived from natural law as "conclusions are derived from principles" and is therefore — unlike the civil law, which is a "determination or specification" of natural law — not "indifferent" to natural justice.[7] On one occasion, to be sure, in accommodating his system to a statement of Isidore's, he assigns the *ius gentium*, together with the *ius civile*, to the category of positive law, in contrast with natural law.[8] The passage, however, seems an aberrant one, for more than once elsewhere he terms "natural law" that which has force from nature and "positive" that which has force from the institution of the law itself,[9] and he says that law derived from natural law as conclusions are derived from principles has a certain force from natural law (aliquid vigoris ex lege naturali),[10] and also that the *ius gentium* needs no special institution.[11] What is more, although in his alternative definitions he always distinguishes the *ius gentium* in some way from natural law, what he sometimes calls natural law he elsewhere calls the *ius gentium*. His central definition of natural law is the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law; [12] yet more than

[7] ST, II–i, q. 95, a. 2 (note the first objection and answer) and a. 4.

A reader of this paper, who contends that, "far from being a contradictory piece of Thomistic theology, II–ii, 10, 10 is in complete harmony with Aquinas' thinking," argues that the solution to the problem of the Article "lies in Aquinas' philosophy and theology of law (I–ii, 90 ff.)." He says, referring one to I–ii, q. 95, a. 2, that the human and divine laws concerned "are 'determinations' of the respective natural laws," and that, as a result, the conflict of laws "lies between positive human and positive divine determinations of natural law."

This argument, however, is in error not only in its treatment of the human law in question as a "determination" of natural law, but also in its final implication that the divine law concerned is a determination of the natural law from which the human law in question is derived. In II–ii, q. 57, a. 2, St. Thomas, accommodating his system to Aristotle's division of law into natural and legal (or positive), does make a distinction within divine law comparable to that between natural law and positive law: "Unde etiam ius divinum per haec duo distingui potest, sicut et ius humanum. Sunt enim in lege divina quaedam praecepta quia bona, et prohibita quia mala: quaedam vero bona quia praecepta, et mala quia prohibita." But the divine law which is comparable to natural law is not to be identified with it. "Per naturalem legem participatur lex aeterna secundum proportionem capacitatis humanae naturae. Sed oportet ut altiori modo dirigatur homo in ultimum finem supernaturalem. Et ideo superadditur lex divinitus data, per quam lex aeterna participatur altiori modo (ST, I, q. 91, a. 4, ad 1)."

[8] ST, II–i, q. 95, a. 4.

[9] II–ii, q. 60, a. 5; cf. II–ii, q. 57, a. 2.

[10] II–i, q. 95, a. 2.

[11] II–ii, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3.

[12] II–i, q. 91, a. 2.

once he describes the *ius gentium* as the rational creature's participation in the law in which all creatures share.[13]

He therefore had every reason to wish to sustain the idea that divine law does not destroy the human law on which dominion is based. Yet, if he provides that infidelity does not, "considered in itself," destroy dominion, in that destruction follows only on Church action, he does not save human law from destruction by divine law. And he says without qualification that it is not destroyed. The Article therefore is ambivalent. By human law infidel dominion over Christians is legitimate; by divine law it is not. Divine law does not destroy human law; but the Church is empowered by divine law to destroy human law whenever it sees fit.

It is interesting to observe how the acute sixteenth-century commentator Cajetan deals with the Article. In his brief direct commentary, he identifies the allusions to canon law and elaborates the statement that infidels would despise the faith if they knew the defections of believers. With reference to the more central provisions he says only, faithful to the Article itself, that St. Thomas holds that the Church "has power even over infidels not subject to it in temporal matters, and that it can deprive them, although it may not do so, of universal as well as particular dominion over Christians."[14] When, however, he comes to the Article on forcible seizure (II–ii, q. 66, a. 8), he alludes to the earlier Article, and, in effect, comments on it indirectly.[15]

The portion of the Article on seizure having to do with infidel dominion is the answer to the objection: "It is permissible to take from someone that which is not his. But the possessions of infidels (res quas infideles habent) do not belong to them, for Augustine, in his letter to the Donatist Vincent, says: 'You falsely call yours things which you do not justly possess and which the laws of earthly rulers have decreed you to lose.' Therefore, it would seem that anyone can rightly steal from infidels." St. Thomas replies that some infidels hold their possessions unjustly because they have been ordered to lose them by the decrees of

[13] II–i, q. 95, a. 4, ad 1; II–ii, q. 57, a. 3.
[14] St. Thomas, Opera omnia (Rome, 1882–), VIII, 92.
[15] Loc. cit., IX, 94–95.

earthly princes, and that therefore their possessions can be taken from them by force, not by private authority, but by public.[16]

When one prefaces to the words quoted in the objection the clause preceding them in the original letter, it becomes clear that St. Augustine considered the infidel dominion in question unjust by divine law as well as forfeit by secular enactment. "Because," he wrote, "earthly possessions are rightly held only by divine law, according to which they belong to the just, or by human law, which is under the control of earthly princes, you falsely call yours those things which you possess without being just and which the laws of earthly rulers have decreed you to lose." [17] St. Thomas, however, in picking up St. Augustine's statement in his reply to the objection, makes the injustice of the infidel dominion in question stem from positive law alone. Now there is nothing in St. Thomas' views to suggest that he, like St. Augustine, held infidel dominion over property other than slaves unjust by divine law, for there is nothing in such dominion to endanger the salvation of Christians. If it is indeed only with such dominion that he is here concerned, there is no conflict between divine law and human law involved. The infidel possessions of the objection and answer can, of course, be understood to include slaves, but although the term *res* and the contextual idea of theft do not necessarily exclude that interpretation, neither do they especially suggest it. It is altogther reasonable to suppose that in this passing argument, in which his immediate interest was in the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate seizure, St. Thomas was thinking of non-human property alone. Certainly there is no reason whatever to suppose that he had the political rule of infidels over Christians in mind. In his commentary, however, Cajetan applies the principle of St. Thomas' reply to infidel mastery over slaves and even to political rule; and when he deals with political rule,

[16] Loc. cit., p. 94: Ad secundum dicendum quod intantum aliqui infideles iniuste res suas possident, inquantum eas *secundum leges terrenorum principum amittere iussi sunt*. Et ideo ab eis possunt per violentiam subtrahi, non privata auctoritate, sed publica.

[17] Epist. XCIII, xii, 50 (Patrologia latina, XXXIII, 345): Et quamvis res quaeque terrena non recte a quoquam possideri possit, nisi vel jure divino, quo cuncta justorum sunt, vel jure humano, quod in potestate regum est terrae, ideoque res vestras falso appelletis, quas nec justi possidetis, et secundum leges regum terrenorum amittere jussi estis . . . .

he introduces from the Article on infidel dominion a version of the statement on laws.

In the part of the commentary of interest here, he makes a threefold distinction in the relationship of infidels to Christian rule. They may be subject *de facto* and *de iure*, as is the case with Jews, heretics, and Moors in Christian lands. They may be subject *de iure* but not *de facto*, as are infidels occupying lands properly belonging to Christians. They may be subject neither *de iure* nor *de facto* — that is to say, they may be pagans who never were under Roman rule, "inhabiting lands in which the Christian name never was (in quibus christianum numquam fuit nomen)." The dominion of the first group of infidels the Church and princes can destroy by legal enactment. Against those subject *de iure* only, Christian princes can justly declare war. The third group of infidels have rulers, who, "whatever the form of their government, are legitimate rulers, and are not deprived of their dominion because of their infidelity; as is said above in Question 10, dominion rests on positive law, infidelity on divine, and divine law does not destroy positive law." [18] I know, says Cajetan, no law concerning temporal possession in this case. Neither a king, nor an emperor, nor the Roman Church can justly wage war to occupy their lands. Christ sent not armed soldiers but preachers to conquer the earth; and even in the Old Testament war was waged against infidels not because they were infidels but because they would not permit transit or had taken what belonged to others.

This last suggestion one must contrast with St. Thomas' assertion, in another Article, that war against infidels is legitimate if its purpose is to prevent them from impeding faith through blasphemies, evil persuasion, or open persecution.[19] The preceding statements one must compare with the Article on infidel dominion over Christians. In sections of his commentary with which we need not deal here, Cajetan considers explicitly problems of infidel dominion over Christian slaves. Although in this section

[18] Horum namque domini, quamvis infideles, legitimi domini sunt, sive regali sive politico regimine gubernentur; nec sunt propter infidelitatem a dominio suorum privati; cum dominium sit ex iure positivo et infidelitas ex divino iure, quod non tollit ius positivum, ut superius in qu. X habitum est.

[19] ST, II–ii, q. 10, a. 8.

he does not speak directly of the problem of infidel dominion over Christians, it is logically involved; and his allusion to Question 10 suggests that, for all his silence, he had the problem in mind.

Now if, as is unlikely, he intends by his phrase, "in which the Christian name never was," that the infidels of the third category do not have any Christian subjects, he would be tacitly placing any instance of infidel dominion over Christians in the two categories in which the infidels are, if not in fact, at least by right subject to Christian rule and in which action can therefore be taken in keeping with positive law. If, as is almost certain, he means merely that the lands have never been held by Christian princes, there is the possibility that the infidels ruling those lands have Christian subjects. This possibility he covers in accordance with the practical provisions of the Article on infidel dominion over Christians, by saying that there is no law calling for deprivation; but it is to be noted that he does not mention here the one aspect of the principal provisions of the earlier Article which he had pointed out in his direct commentary — that the Church has the right to deprive of their dominion even those infidels not subject to it in temporal matters. Furthermore, in citing the statement on the laws, he substitutes "positive law" for "human law." Such a shift of terms in the case of a commentator so careful as Cajetan and so aware of technical problems, can scarcely have been a careless one, to be explained by the exceptional passage in which St. Thomas terms the *ius gentium* "positive law." One must rather suppose that he used the term "positive" advisedly, because he recognized that in the provisions for existing dominion in II–ii, q. 10, a. 10, although positive law is respected, the *ius gentium* is destroyed, and, correspondingly, that although in his own third category there is no deprivation at all and therefore no law destroyed, in his first two positive law is preserved, but not the *ius gentium.* In fact, since Cajetan introduces this long discussion into a question where it is doubtfully relevant, it looks very much as if, troubled by the ambivalence of the Article on infidel dominion over Christians — by its assertion that divine law does not destroy human law, in the face of its destruction of the *ius gentium* in practice and of positive law in principle — he avoided wrestling with its difficulties in the proper place, and

chose, instead, to discuss its central question obliquely in connection with a passage which, depending solely on provisions of positive law against infidel property, is consonant with the assertion that divine law does not destroy human law.

In the Article on apostate rulers (II–ii, q. 12, a. 2), the problem of infidel rule over Christians is present, and consequently a conflict of the laws threatens. St. Thomas, however, as is noted above, finds a relatively ingenious solution. After reasserting that because divine law does not destroy human law, infidelity is not in itself repugnant to dominion, he says:

> But anyone sinning through loss of faith can, through sentence, lose his right to dominion, as he might for other crimes. It does not pertain to the Church to punish infidelity in those who have never had faith. As the Apostle says, I Cor. v, [12], "For what have I to do to judge them also that are without?" But the infidelity of those who have had faith can be punished by sentence, and it is suitable that they should be punished by loss of dominion over Christian subjects, for their continued rule might lead to corruption of the faith.[20]

Here, instead of asserting that the apostate's loss of dominion is inherently related to the consequence of the defection, namely, the infidelity itself, he regards it as related only to the act of defection, namely, the sin of the loss of faith; and, accordingly, his treatment of it is as a punishment meted out for that crime, as it might be for other crimes. Thus, making the deprivation depend rather on a general provision of criminal law than on the infidelity itself, he is able to deal with the case of the apostate ruler as a problem in which divine law is not directly involved.

In saying that born infidels, who commit no crime in their infidelity, are not subject to the punishment of loss of dominion, St. Thomas may, at first sight, seem to be contradicting the provisions of the Article on infidel dominion; but, as Bellarmine long ago understood, he is not. In the course of controversy with

[20] Opera omnia (Rome, 1882–), VIII, 105: Sed aliquis per infidelitatem peccans potest sententialiter ius dominii amittere, sicut et quandoque propter alias culpas. Ad Ecclesiam autem non pertinet punire infidelitatem in illis qui numquam fidem susceperunt: secundum illud Apostoli, I ad Cor., v: *Quid mihi de his qui foris sunt iudicare?* Sed infidelitatem illorum qui fidem susceperunt potest sententialiter punire. Et convenienter in hoc puniuntur quod subditis fidelibus dominari non possint: hoc enim vergere posset in magnam fidei corruptionem.

Bellarmine, early in the seventeenth century, Barclay, who denied that the Church could deprive infidels of their dominion, had termed St. Thomas' explanation that infidels, in virtue of their infidelity, deserve to lose their power over the faithful, a "bad reason, unworthy of such a man." [21] To this Bellarmine returned a contemptuous reply; and since Barclay had cited I Cor. v, 12, in support of his own position, Bellarmine observed that Question 12, Article 2 of the Summa is not in contradiction with Question 10, Article 10. In Question 12, Bellarmine says, St. Thomas applied the statement from the Epistle to the Corinthians to infidels insofar as they are infidels, and not insofar as they rule Christians. For infidelity alone the Church cannot judge infidels; it can, however, deprive them of dominion over Christians, especially when they try to turn Christians from the faith.[22]

Perhaps the case is clearer if one notes a point called to my attention — that in II–ii, q. 108, a. 4, St. Thomas distinguishes between *poena secundum rationem poenae* and *poena damni*, the former being punishment for sin, the latter "medicine," intended in part to prevent future sin and to provide future good, a punishment *sine culpa*, but not *sine causa*. Since the context of the statement that it does not pertain to the Church to punish the infidelity of born infidels is criminality or guilt, one may assume that the word "punish" is here to be taken in the first sense, and that in Question 10, Article 10, on the other hand, the assertion that infidels deserve to lose their dominion over the faithful is to be understood in terms of the *poena damni*.

Pègues reconciles the two Articles to the same effect as Bellarmine, but in different terms. He says that inasmuch as the Church acts against born infidels in the interest of the Christians "whom it has a right to proclaim free," its power over them is, in a sense, extraordinary and indirect.[23] This is an explanation in keeping with St. Thomas' statement in his commentary on the Epistle to the Corinthians: "The prelates of the churches have spiritual

[21] Gulielmus Barclaius, De potestate pape, xxi (edition of 1609 [n. p.], p. 167).

[22] Roberto Bellarmino, De potestate summi pontificis in temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, xxi (Disputationum . . . tomus primus, etc. [Cologne, 1617–20], VII, 936).

[23] Thomas Pègues, Commentaire français littéral de la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, 1907–33), X, 276–77.

power only over those who are of the faith . . . . Indirectly, however, they have power over those who are outside, in that they can prohibit Christians from communicating with them." [24]

The Article on infidel dominion, then, is not gainsaid by the one on the dominion of apostates, but holds, in its rigor and its ambivalence. Given that ambivalence, it is not altogether surprising that it has been frequently misinterpreted. Literal expositions, such as one finds in Baumann,[25] and Pègues [26] — really little more than translations — perforce represent it accurately. So, too, does the paraphrase of Antoniades.[27] Bellarmine, as is apparent above, interpreted it correctly. He quoted its main sections, beginning with the statement on the two laws, at the head of a list of citations from St. Thomas supporting papal power in temporal affairs.[28] Rivière, who refers frequently to Bellarmine, introduced the statement on deprivation into a similar passage.[29] Iung, too, cited it,[30] and so did Goedeckemeyer,[31] who was concerned to warn against what he considered aggression on the part of the Church in his own day. Schilling's account of the Article is altogether sound,[32] and Grabmann used the statement on the laws properly.[33] If, however, some scholars have represented the Article correctly, others — among them the most widely read

[24] In Epistolam I ad Corinthios, c. v, lect. 3 (Opera omnia [Parma, 1852–73], XIII, 192–93). Cf. the last paragraph of the Respondeo dicendum of ST, II–ii, q. 10, a. 9.

[25] Johann Julius Baumann, Die Staatslehre des h. Thomas von Aquino: ein Beitrag zur Frage zwischen Kirche und Staat (Leipzig, 1873), 182–84.

[26] Op. cit., X, 276.

[27] Basilius Antoniades, Die Staatslehre des Thomas ab Aquino (Leipzig, 1890), p. 106.

[28] Op. cit., Praefatio (VII, 831).

[29] Jean Rivière, Le problème de l'église et de l'état au temps de Philippe le Bel (Louvain, 1926), pp. 49–50.

[30] Nicolas Iung, Un Franciscain, théologien du pouvoir pontifical au xiv^e^ siècle, Alvaro Pelayo, évèque et pénitencier de Jean XXII (L'église et l'état au moyen âge, III) (Paris, 1931), p. 124, n. 1.

[31] A. Goedeckemeyer, "Die Staatslehre des Thomas von Aquino," Preussische Jahrbücher, CXIII (1903), 417–18.

[32] Otto Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin (2d ed.; Munich, 1930), pp. 234–35. The interpretation appears also in the first edition (1923), p. 201.

[33] Martin Grabmann, Studien über den Einfluss der aristotelischen Philosophie auf die mittelalterlichen Theorien über das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrg. 1934, Heft 2) (Munich, 1934), p. 13.

historians of medieval political thought — have repeatedly misconstrued St. Thomas' position either by disregarding all but the statement on the relationship of the two laws or by misreading or failing to give due weight to the remainder of the Article.

Some of the interpretations, while involving misunderstanding of one sort or another, yet recognize that St. Thomas upholds the Church's right to interfere in some way with the dominion of infidels over Christians. Thus Glez, in his article on the temporal power of the papacy in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, says: "If the Church can in exceptional cases pronounce the deposition of guilty Catholic princes, it can also, if it judges good, suppress juridically the power of infidels over Christians; but it does not judge it good unless the power of princes constitutes a grave danger for believers, for in any case, St. Thomas places beyond question the natural rights of authority, which nothing can abolish." [34] Tischleder interprets the Article as concerned with power over slaves and not over political subjects. In discussing the Article on apostates, he says that it is important that St. Thomas maintains that the Church has power of judgment over kings and powerholders (Gewalthaber) only if they have "somehow once been subject to it." [35] In examining the one on infidel dominion, he says that St. Thomas "recognizes in the Church, even in the cases having to do with infidels not subject to it, the right to suspend [Tischleder writes "suspendieren" and even italicizes it, although the Latin is "tollere"] power and right of disposition over slaves who have become Christians." [36]

Glez, however, is mistaken in saying that St. Thomas makes the criterion for the cases in which action is taken the presence of grave danger. To St. Thomas, all dominion of infidels over Christians is gravely dangerous, and it is the difference between infidels who are, and those who are not, subject to the Church in temporal matters which provides the basis of the distinction for the cases in which action is taken. Furthermore, even if St.

[34] Gustav Glez, "Pouvoir du pape dans l'ordre temporel," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant and E. Mangenot (Paris, 1909–50), XII[2] (1935), 2731.

[35] Peter Tischleder, Ursprung und Träger der Staatsgewalt nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas und seiner Schule (Münster in Westphalia, 1923), p. 48.

[36] Ibid., p. 47.

Thomas had used the principle Glez attributes to him, one could scarcely agree that he would be placing "beyond question the natural rights of authority."

Tischleder's construction, which Linhardt appears to share,[37] is equally inadmissible. It is true that all the examples of Church sentence which St. Thomas cites have to do with slaves, and all the answers to objections with one or another form of personal service; but the limitation is probably due to the fact that, with one exception, the only denials of infidel power over Christians to be found in canon law concerned slavery and other forms of personal service.[38] That St. Thomas did not, however, intend to limit his argument to private dominion, is apparent from other aspects of the Article. For one thing, using the exceptional provision in canon law — that no Jew or pagan should hold public office in which he would be over Christians [39] — he concludes the section on new institution of dominion with the words, "And so the Church cannot at all permit infidels to acquire dominion over the faithful or to be placed over them in any office." For another, the terms repeatedly coupled in the Article, *dominium* and *praelatio* (rendered above as "dominion" and "rule"), make it impossible to conclude that he deals with slavery and personal service alone. The term *dominium*, to be sure, is ambiguous, but it is to be noted that in the closely related Article on apostate princes it is his term for political rule; and, in any case, the connotations of *praelatio*, as St. Thomas uses it elsewhere, are so strongly governmental [40] that, even if he had not mentioned office, it should be apparent that he did not have slavery alone in mind. Evidently Tischleder, whose approach is apologetic,[41] was moved to construe the Article

[37] See below, p. 116.

[38] Gratian, Decretum, dist. 54, cc. 13 and 15–18; Decretales Greg. IX, V, vi, cc. 1, 2, 8, 13.

[39] Decretales, V, vi, cc. 16, 18; cf. Decretum, dist. 54, c. 14.

[40] In II, dist. 44 of the Libri sententiarum, Lombard, referring to Rom. xiii, writes: "Sed sciendum est Apostolum ibi loqui de seculari potestate, scilicet rege, et principe, et hujusmodi (PL, CXCII, 757)." When St. Thomas comments on this portion of Lombard's work, he raises the question, "Utrum omnis praelatio sit a Deo," and, as is evident from various allusions he makes to kings, to reigning, and to subjects, has political power primarily, if not exclusively, in mind (II Sent., dist. 44, q. 1, a. 2 [Opera omnia (Parma), VI, 784–85]). In the next Article in his commentary, "Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset dominium," where one must suppose him again concerned in part with political rule, he employs the terms *praelatio* and *dominium* in conjunction, as he does in the Summa Article.

[41] He makes, for example, great point of the fact that the provision against new

as he did chiefly by the effort to reconcile it with his mistaken interpretation of the Article on the dominion of apostates.

Other scholars say that St. Thomas denies the Church the right to destroy the dominion of simple infidels, as distinguished from that of heretics and apostates. In his much used text Sabine says: "Revelation adds to reason but never destroys it . . . the Christian subjects of a pagan prince are not justified in refusing him obedience . . . the Church may rightly absolve the subjects of an apostate or heretic ruler. But the Church ought not to depose a ruler merely because he is an infidel. Thomas' very moderate and reasonable position . . . is diametrically opposed to that taken by the extreme papalists of the following century, such as Egidius Colonna . . . ." [42] Hans Meyer represents St. Thomas as saying that although the Church does not permit new institution of infidel rule, "when the civil authority already exists, the ruler's power of dominion is entirely removed from the control of the Church because ecclesiastical authority extends only to those who are members of the ecclesiastical community." [43] Clearly, the essential element in these incorrect representations of St. Thomas' view is, again, misunderstanding of the Article on apostates.

Sabine, in his interpretation, not only reads St. Thomas as denying the right of the Church to interfere with the dominion of simple infidels, but also, by his statement that revelation never destroys reason, creates a false impression of St. Thomas' view of the general relationship of divine law to human law. This is likewise the impression created by the remaining interpretations with which we shall deal.

Lagarde uses St. Thomas' statement to the effect that divine law does not destroy human law as evidence for his generalization that the medieval thinkers who were inspired by Aristotle held

---

establishment of infidel dominion over Christians brings into question no existing right, but only the legal capacity for acquiring a right (p. 46).

[42] George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (Rev. ed.; New York, [1950]), pp. 253–54. Cf. pp. 275–76, where he says that Egidius' doctrine was "much less enlightened than Thomas' opinion that infidelity is no bar to the exercise of political power."

[43] Thomas von Aquin, sein System und seine geistesgeschichtliche Stellung (Bonn, 1938), pp. 507–508 (in the translation, The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas [St. Louis, 1944], p. 451).

that the law of political societies "could not be compromised" by the advent of the law of grace.[44] Linhardt refers to the Article as indicating that the Church respects the natural law of private rights.[45] Santonastaso, contrasting the views of St. Thomas with those of Egidius Romanus, says that St. Thomas, ever mindful of the force of the natural, maintains that dominion cannot be destroyed by divine law.[46] In their widely read History of Medieval Political Theory in the West,[47] R. W. and A. J. Carlyle say that, like Innocent IV, St. Thomas maintains that dominion is lawful among unbelievers, "and even admits that an actually existing authority of unbelievers over Christian people is legitimate, though it may be abolished by the authority of the Church"; but although they give all the significant portions of the passage in the Latin footnote, in their text they make no mention of the striking statement that "infidels, in virtue of their infidelity, deserve to lose their dominion over Christians" — a procedure which, interestingly, reverses that of an earlier article in which R. W. Carlyle translated the sentence containing the justification for deprivation and inserted in parentheses the Latin for every portion but that.[48] Moreover, they climax their exposition by translating the statement that divine law does not destroy human law, and that therefore the distinction between infidel and Christian does not of itself destroy infidel authority over Christians — thus reversing the emphasis of the Article and giving a decidedly misleading impression of St. Thomas' view. In another portion of their work, they reinforce this impression by declaring the theory of Egidius Romanus "in flat contradiction to the doctrine both of St. Thomas Aquinas and of Innocent IV" and paraphrasing the sentence on the relationship of the two laws without mentioning the qualification, "considered in itself." [49]

[44] Georges de Lagarde, La naissance de l'esprit laique au déclin du moyen âge (2d ed.; Paris, 1948), I, 176. Cf. p. 92, n. 10.

[45] Robert Linhardt, Die Sozialprinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, Versuch einer Grundlegung der speziellen Soziallehren des Aquinaten aus den Quellen erarbeitet (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1932), p. 130 and n. 10.

[46] Giuseppe Santonastaso, "Il pensiero politico di Egidio Romano," Civiltà Moderna, XI (1939), 198.

[47] (Edinburgh, 1922–36), V, 34.

[48] "Some Notes on the Theories of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Church and State and on Law," Economic Review, VI (1896), 77.

[49] Op. cit., V, 404–405.

Clearly, the misinterpretations of Santonastaso, Linhardt, Lagarde and the Carlyles are due almost entirely — as those of Sabine and Glez are in part — to the deceptive force of the statement on the laws. However, in the case of the Carlyles, there seems to have been in play at the same time an indisposition — no doubt, one of which they were not conscious — to recognize what would be to them the harsher and less acceptable element in St. Thomas' view; and there is reason to think that the subtle misrepresentation which resulted was an influence in some of the other interpretations — possibly in that of Lagarde, and almost certainly, to judge from the statements contrasting the view of Egidius with that of St. Thomas, in those of Santonastaso and Sabine.

One may note, incidentally, that although Egidius' view that no infidel dominion of any sort is legitimate, is very different from that of St. Thomas, it is not so completely opposed to it as the Carlyles, Santonastaso, and Sabine suggest. Especially in view of certain paradoxical qualifications in Egidius' argument,[50] one is tempted to speculate that he was well aware of the complexity of St. Thomas' view and perhaps felt in it a partial cover for a boldness that many scholars have found very strange.[51]

. . .

The explanation of the ambivalence of St. Thomas' view lies in the existence, in his day, of a dual tradition on the question of infidel dominion over Christians, complicated by a dual tradition on the basis of dominion in general. The one tradition on infidel dominion had as its basis the series of canons denying Jews or pagans the right to possess Christian slaves or to hold public office. The fundamental provisions, echoing Roman Imperial edicts, had been laid down by sixth-century popes and councils,[52]

[50] In setting down the requirement that kings must be instituted by the Church he says twice that he is not concerned with any but Christian peoples (De ecclesiastica potestate, ed. Richard Scholz [Weimar, 1929], lib. I, c. 5, p. 55; lib. II, c. 14, p. 133).

[51] E.g., Charles Jourdain, Gius. Oxilia, Ugo Mariani, Paul Janet, Gerardo Bruni, Glez, and the Carlyles.

[52] In the Decretum, dist. 54, chapters 13, 15, and 16, concerning the slaves of Jews, and chapter 14, barring Jews from public office, are all sixth-century pronouncements. The Roman parallels on slavery are, among others, Cod. Theod.,

and had been reiterated and elaborated in later official pronouncements.[53] The other tradition on infidel dominion had authoritative sanction in St. Augustine's assertion in his comments on Psalm cxxiv, with citation of Eph. vi, 5, "Servants, be obedient unto them that according to the flesh are your masters, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ," that Christ bade those who, having infidel masters, had become Christians, not to leave their masters but rather to serve them.[54] The principle, St. Augustine had added, applies to all rulers and powers of this world, for Christian soldiers served Julian the Apostate. "When he wished them to worship idols, they put God before him; but when he said, 'Draw your swords, and go against that nation,' they obeyed without hesitation. They distinguished the Eternal Lord from the temporal lord, but they were subject to the temporal for the sake of the Eternal." In keeping with St. Augustine's view, Peter Lombard had interpreted Rom. xiii, 1, "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained by God," as the Apostle's answer to those who thought that "evil masters, and especially infidels, should not rule Christians," and that even if the masters were good, all should be equal.[55]

The two views of infidel dominion over Christians are counterposed in typical scholastic fashion in the Summa theologica long ascribed to Alexander of Hales, but now recognized as a composite work.[56] In the Summa, the pertinent sections of which probably were written before 1245,[57] one chapter contends that Jews and pagans cannot "be over" (praeesse) Christians.[58] Among the potential objections cited are a canon permitting Jews to have

---

XVI, ix, 2 and 5; on office, Cod. Theod., XVI, x, 21 and especially Cod. Just., I, ix, 18.

[53] Thus, for example, Innocent III extended the provisions of Dist. 54, c. 14 to pagans (Decretales Greg. IX, V, vi, c. 16); and the Third Lateran Council broadened the provisions against personal service (V, vi, cc. 5 and 8).

[54] Enarrationes in psalmos; in psalm. cxxiv (PL, XXXVII, 1653–54).

[55] In Epistolam ad Romanos, xiii (PL, CXCI, 1503–4).

[56] Victorinus Doucet in the Quaracchi edition of the Summa (1924–47), IV[1], ccclxix.

[57] Loc. cit., cccliv–v, and V. Doucet, "Autour des 'Prolegomena ad Summum fr. Alexandri,'" Archivum franciscanum historicum, XLIII (1950), 196–200.

[58] Summa theologica (Quaracchi), Tome III, no. 746.

Christian *coloni*,[59] and I Tim. vi, 1, "Let as many as are servants under the yoke count their own masters as worthy of all honor," together with a gloss interpreting "masters" as infidels. There is no allusion to Peter Lombard, to St. Augustine, or to Eph. vi, 5. The compiler asks how it is that in spite of the fact that servitude is sanctioned by divine law and that the Catholic Church injures no one, rights over slaves can be destroyed in the interest of Christian faith; and he answers: "The Catholic Church intends to do injustice to no one, but it has decreed thus, lest it do God injustice. It would be doing God injustice if it endangered anyone's faith in order to preserve temporal justice." In the preceding chapter he says that although the Church cannot judge simple infidels by inflicting spiritual penalties on them, it can inflict temporal penalties, and indirectly, even spiritual, by removing Christians from communion with them. He cites the numerous canonical regulations and denies that they are in conflict with the apostolic injunction not to judge those "outside," which he explains as applying only to direct spiritual penalty.[60]

It is possible that in the question whether infidels can be over Christians the compiler had slavery alone in mind. Although he mentions the canonical provision against infidels holding office over Christians, he gives it no part in his final answer; and his *praeesse* is more ambiguous than St. Thomas' *praelatio*. However, in a question on obedience to apostate princes, he offers provisions similar to those of St. Thomas for the subjects of apostates and then adds, "But it would seem that one must answer otherwise, since some Christians are under princes who have never been of the faith; for here, if they cannot be helped otherwise, they can be aided in a just war, so long as it does not result in harm to the faith and does result in preservation of the faithful." [61]

It is probably because the Summist was still within the tradition that held dominion a necessary evil consequent upon the Fall,[62] rather than a function natural to all rational beings, that he could so easily sacrifice the right founded in human law to the needs of faith. To Innocent IV, who published his Apparatus shortly after

[59] Decretales Greg. IX, V, vi, 2.
[60] Summa theologica, Tome III, no. 745.
[61] Op. cit., Tome III, no. 780.
[62] Op. cit., Tome III, no. 608.

1245,[63] a conviction of the right of all rational creatures to dominion made the sacrifice of human law more difficult. Dealing, in his commentary on the De voto et voti redemptione,[64] with the question of infidel dominion in connection with that of the justice of taking the Holy Land from the Moslems, he begins with a statement which sorts with those of St. Augustine and Peter Lombard, except for a turn of phrase which indicates that he held a view of the general basis of dominion they, like the "Alexander" Summist, did not share. Infidels, he says, can lawfully and sinlessly possess "lordships, possessions, and jurisdictions" because God made them for all rational creatures, so that neither the pope nor other Christians can take them away. Then, however, he goes on to say that the pope has power not only over Christians, but also over all infidels *de iure*, if not *de facto*. He is right to plan to recover the Holy Land both because it was consecrated by the presence of Christ and because the Church is heir to Roman imperial power. Even in lands never under Christian princes, he can provide that rulers should not unjustly molest the Christians under them, and in case of serious wrong, he can by sentence wrest Christians completely from their jurisdiction. However, he should do this only for grave cause and should tolerate infidel rulers so long as there is no danger to Christians and no grave scandal arises. He can also command infidels to admit preachers of the Gospel into their lands, and if they refuse to obey in any of the foregoing cases or in others in which he has a right to command, can declare war against them. The precept that it does not pertain to the Church to judge those outside means only that it cannot excommunicate them or compel them to the faith. On account of danger a lord can be compelled to accept commutation; men often lose their possessions without being guilty of anything, and there is a presumption in favor of religious claims (nam favorabilis est ratio que pro religione facit).[65]

[63] Joh. Friedrich von Schulte, Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf Papst Gregor IX (Stuttgart, 1875–80), II, 93.

[64] Apparatus super quinque libros Decretalium (Venice, 1481 [unpaged]), Quod super his (III, xxxiv, 8).

[65] Walter Ullmann evidently failed to read this passage, for he says (Medieval Papalism: the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists [Maitland Memorial Lecture . . . 1948] [London, 1949], p. 126): "Innocent IV confined the papal

When he finds it possible, then, Innocent justifies the Church's right of action in terms of human law. Although he regards the consecrated nature of the Holy Land sufficient reason for reclaiming it, he nonetheless also establishes the Church's right of action through an inherited temporal jurisdiction. Where this claim does not exist, he limits Church action to special instances of wrong and danger to the faith. This provision, however — at least insofar as it depends on danger to faith — does not constitute a reconciliation of the Church's right with the universal human right to dominion. Innocent's view, therefore, like that of St. Thomas, is ambivalent. He says that the pope cannot destroy infidel dominion, but also that, for religious reasons, he can.

In his commentary on the De voto et voti redemptione, which draws largely on Innocent's, Hostiensis (d. 1271) resolves the ambivalence through what one may call a chronological distinction. That is to say, he accepts the principle that dominion is for all rational creatures as valid only for the pre-Christian era. He begins his discussion by reiterating Innocent's argument,[66] making only such minor changes as the judicious addition of "without just cause" to the statement that neither the pope nor other Christians can take away the possessions of infidels; but then, after echoing an additional brief section of Innocent's commentary, which ends with the words, "Thus, too, the goods of schismatics and heretics can lawfully be occupied in accordance with the laws of princes," he adds, "It seems to me, however, that at the advent of Christ all honor and all principacy and all dominion and jurisdiction rightfully and for just cause and by Him who does not err, was taken away from all infidels and transferred to the faithful." As scriptural proof he cites Ecclus. x, 8, "Regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter iniustitiam, et iniurias et

right of interference to the countries which had at any time been ruled by Christian princes but had been wrested from them and placed under a non-Christian ruler." Elsewhere (pp. 131–32) he says: "Something in the way of a compromise between these two theories [those of Innocent and Hostiensis] was achieved by later canonists. It was agreed that force should not be employed to subjugate these pagan countries to Christian rule, but that they should be won over by the effects of missionary activity, that is, by peaceful penetration. Only when the right of entry was refused to emissaries, should force be used." This entire proposition is in Innocent himself.

[66] In tertium Decretalium librum commentaria, Quod super his, sections 6–26 (Venice, 1581, p. 128).

contumelias et diversos dolos," and Matt. xxi, 43, "Auferetur a vobis regnum et dabitur genti facienti fructus eius." Finally he concludes: "We firmly assert that by right infidels should be subject to the faithful, and not the contrary . . . . We concede, however, that infidels who recognize the dominion of the Church are to be tolerated, and may have property and Christian *coloni*, and even jurisdiction." [67]

This, then, was the state of the question at the time St. Thomas wrote. Let us now see how the two traditions are reflected in his view.

The tradition favoring the legitimacy of infidel dominion is represented, in his Article, in the tentative objections, and in his general statement on the laws. That statement is so similar, both in its substance and in its position in the argument, to the sentence with which Innocent opened his discussion, that one must suppose that it was there — either in the original commentary or in Hostiensis' transcription of it — that St. Thomas found his immediate inspiration. Among the tentative objections, however, one finds no allusion whatever to the statements of St. Augustine and of Peter Lombard.

It may be that St. Thomas did not introduce Peter Lombard's interpretation of Rom. xiii, 1 because he considered it too questionable to constitute a real objection. In his own commentary on Rom. xiii [68] there is no suggestion that the Apostle was referring especially to infidel masters. In the case of St. Augustine's statement, at once more fully developed and more authoritative than Peter's, the omission of any reference may have been a stratagem. One suspects that both "Alexander" and St. Thomas, in building the first objection in their discussions on I. Tim. vi, 1, instead of Eph. vi, 5, which St. Augustine had used, were avoiding any reference to his sanction for the contention that Christians should remain subject to infidel masters. Although St. Thomas never cites St. Augustine's commentary on Psalm cxxiv, it is improbable that he was unaware of the passage and equally unlikely that the earlier Summist was. One's suspicion that the omission was de-

[67] Loc. cit., sections 26–28. Cf. Hostiensis' Summa aurea, De iudaeis, de sarracenis, et eorum servis (V, vi), on the final concession.

[68] In Epistolam ad Romanos, xiii, lect. 1 (Opera omnia [Parma], XIII, 128 ff.).

liberate is heightened by the fact that in the questions on apostate dominion, both writers introduce as an objection a canon of the Decretum (C. xi, q. 3, c. 94), in which Ambrose is credited with saying that Christian soldiers served Julian the Apostate, and that although both must have recognized that the canon is an abbreviation of that portion of c. 98 of the same Question which is drawn from St. Augustine's commentary on Psalm cxxiv, they mention Ambrose alone. Very possibly, in the desire to keep out of mind St. Augustine's authoritative statement favoring infidel dominion over Christians, they did not wish to allude to it in related questions.

The tradition against the validity of infidel dominion over Christians is represented in the Article in certain allusions to the canons, and particularly in the statement that infidels deserve to lose their dominion over Christians. From the many similarities it seems probable that St. Thomas worked with "Alexander's" Summa at hand.[69] If, however, he drew on it for much of his argument, it is from Hostiensis, who first said explicitly that infidel dominion over Christians is wrong, that he appears to have derived his statement justifying the Church's right to destroy infidel dominion.

Hostiensis' well-known passage has never, apparently, been linked with St. Thomas' Article. The nearest approach to an association of the two appears to be Linhardt's statement that Questions 10 to 12 are one portion of the Summa in which St. Thomas uses the canonists.[70] Yet there is an interesting resemblance between St. Thomas' words, "Infidels in virtue of their infidelity deserve to lose their power over the faithful, who are transferred to the children of God (qui transferuntur in filios Dei)," and Hostiensis' "was taken away from all infidels and transferred to the faithful (ad fideles translata)." The resemblance has been obscured by the customary interpretation of

[69] The pertinent questions of "Alexander's" Summa draw much from writings of Raymond of Pennafort and of John of Rupella; but if one can rely on the close analysis of the dependence in the Quaracchi edition (IV[1], ccxc), St. Thomas shares with the Summist arguments not in the earlier writings — the objection that Christians are sometimes the *coloni* of Jews, and an argument from Gregory VII which forms the *Sed contra* in both discussions of obedience to apostate rulers.

[70] Die Sozialprinzipien, p. 24.

St. Thomas' phrase, "qui transferuntur in filios Dei," as meaning "who are becoming" or "changed into" the children of God.[71] Although grammatically this is an admissible construction,[72] the phrase "were becoming the children of God," wherever it appeared, was so clearly an allusion to John i, 12, "Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius," that the use of the term *fieri* — in any case a far more common construction for "become" — was all but mandatory. When, elsewhere in the Summa, St. Thomas speaks of those "who, through grace, are becoming the children of God," he uses the term *fieri*.[73] On the other hand, he follows the common usage of *transferre in* for the transfer of dominion.[74]

There is, consequently, every reason to understand his words as intending the transfer of dominion over Christians from infidels to Christians; and with this understanding, the resemblance of St. Thomas' words to those of Hostiensis is so marked, the contexts — even though Hostiensis' view is more extreme — so similar, that it seems probable that he was drawing on Hostiensis.[75] Back of Hostiensis' words there lay a passage, incorporated into the Decretum, in which St. Augustine used the citation from Matthew and said that the heretics he addressed should rather be astonished they had held anything thus far that they now lost it.

[71] Thus the translation of the Summa theologica by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London, 1911–35), VII, 140; Pègues, op. cit., X, 238; R. W. Carlyle, in the Economic Review, VI (1896), 77; Goedeckemeyer, loc. cit., p. 418.

[72] The stock examples of the usage are from Ovid and Quintilian. Cf., e.g., A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary, rev. . . . by C. T. Lewis and C. Short (Oxford, [1951]), p. 1890.

[73] ST, II–ii, q. 104, a. 6: Et ideo illi qui fiunt filii Dei per gratiam . . . .

[74] E. g., ST, II–ii, q. 78, a. 2, ad. 5: ". . . ille qui mutuat pecuniam transfert dominium pecuniae in eum cui mutuat." Cf., e. g., Aegidius of Lessines, De usuris in communi, c. 5 (printed as Opus. LXVI in Vol. XVII of the Parma edition of the works of St. Thomas). Cf., also, the use of the accusative with *in* for the transfer of the Empire: e. g., Innocent III, in Decretales Greg. IX, I, vi, c. 34; Gregory IX *ipse*, in Huillard-Bréholles, Hist. diplomatica Fred. II (Paris, 1852–61), IV, 922; Konrad of Megenburg, De translacione Romani imperii, in Richard Scholz, Unbekannte Kirchenpolitischen Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern (Rome, 1911), II, 251.

[75] Hostiensis added to his Commentary until his death in 1271, and St. Thomas wrote the portion of the Summa containing the Article in 1271–72; but it is probable that version after version of the Commentary was circulated before 1271 (B. C. Kuhlmann, Der Gesetzesbegriff beim Hl. Thomas von Aquin im Lichte des Rechtsstudium seiner Zeit [Bonn, 1912], p. 104), so that St. Thomas could long have been familiar with it at the time he wrote.

"God gave to us the things taken from you." [76] St. Thomas, however, would seem to have developed his phrase not from St. Augustine, but from Hostiensis, for in St. Augustine's statement the word *transfer* does not occur, while in Hostiensis' commentary it is given peculiar emphasis through repetition in the quotation from Ecclesiasticus.

St. Thomas' position on the question of infidel dominion over Christians is, then, an original combination of elements in earlier thirteenth-century views. Like Innocent, he felt drawn, in the face of all countervailing considerations, by the idea that dominion is a right inherent in the very nature of man; and, therefore, he could neither be content with the facile disposition of "temporal justice" in "Alexander's" Summa, nor accept Hostiensis' resolution of the conflict between human law and divine law through the idea that at the advent of Christ the law of grace displaced human law in the determination of dominion. Unlike Innocent, however, and like the Summist and Hostiensis, he believed that all infidel dominion over Christians is wrong. Hence the complete

[76] Contra literas Petiliani, ii, c. 43, § 102; in Gratian's Decretum, C. 23, q. 7, c. 2 (Corpus iuris canonicus, ed. E. Friedburg [Leipzig, 1879], I, 951): Si de rebus vel locis ecclesiasticis, que non tenetis, querimini, possunt et Iudei se iustos dicere, et iniquitatem nobis obicere, quia locum, in quo inpii regnaverunt, modo Christiani possident. Quid ergo indignum, si ea, que tenebant heretici, secundum parem Domini voluntatem catholici tenent? Ad omnes iniquos et inpios illa vox Domini valet: "Auferetur a vobis regnum Dei, et dabitur genti facienti iusticiam." An frustra scriptum est: Labores inpiorum pii edent?["] Quapropter magis mirari debetis, quod adhuc tenetis aliquid, quam quod aliquid amisistis . . . . Si qua jam praecisi possidere coepistis, quia vobis ablata nobis Dominus dedit, non ideo concupiscimus aliena, quia illius imperio, cujus sunt omnia, facta sunt nostra, et juste nostra sunt . . . .

That Hostiensis was using St. Augustine appears not only from the parallel quotation, but also from the relation of his argument to the commentary of the Glossa ordinaria on the passage. The gloss reads: "Because of this some say that we can lawfully take away the possession of Jews and Saracens, and they understand the words of *c. dispar. q. 8* of the same *Causa* to concern the persons of Jews and not things; but I hold differently, because Jews pay tribute and hold what they have by our will (Gratian, Decretum, ed. Bartholomaeus Brixiensis [Strassburg, 1484], unpaged)." (C. dispar. — an eleventh-century papal letter to the bishops of Spain — says that although Jews, who everywhere "are ready to serve," are not to be attacked, war against Saracens, who persecute Christians and drive them from their cities and lands, is just." It is to be noted, too, that in the paragraph from which Hostiensis departs, Innocent was using the preceding chapter in the Decretum, one in which St. Augustine says that heretics shall lose their goods and that only the true Church properly possesses the goods of the poor and the basilicas of the congregations.

ambivalence in his view, in contrast with a merely partial ambivalence in the view of Innocent.

. . .

The ambivalence of St. Thomas' view found echoes in fourteenth-century theory. In his De regimine christiano James of Viterbo says that it is "according to divine law, whatever may be the case with human," that infidel dominion is unjust.[77] From many indications, James wrote his tract with the intention of providing a more moderate argument in justification of the temporal power of the papacy than that Egidius Romanus had just drawn up in his De ecclesiastica potestate. When he says that some maintain that the temporal power is, in its institution, independent of the spiritual, and others, that the temporal power is legitimate only if it is conjoined with or instituted by the spiritual, he is, in effect, contrasting the views of St. Thomas and Egidius. His own answer — a "*via media*" — is "that the institution of the temporal power is materially and inchoatively from the natural inclination of man . . . , but in perfection and formally from the spiritual power."[78] As authority for his position Egidius had referred to the De civitate dei, XIX, 22, where, he says, St. Augustine maintains that there is no true republic of which Christ is not founder and ruler; and he had added the argument that anyone who is unjust does not merit dominion, that justice is giving each his due, that anyone who turns from God does not give God his due, and that therefore infidels do not justly possess dominion.[79] James reproduces the argument in abbreviated form, but inserts in the conclusion the qualification "by divine law, whatever may be the case with human."

Which law is to prevail in the practical determination of dominion James does not make clear in the immediate context; but elsewhere in the tract,[80] in answer to an objection founded on

[77] H.-X. Arquillière, Le plus ancien traité de l'église: Jacques de Viterbe, De regimine christiano, 1301–1302, Étude des sources et édition critique (Études de théologie historique publiées sous la direction des professeurs de théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris) (Paris, 1926), p. 241 (lib. II, c. 7).

[78] Loc. cit., pp. 231–32.

[79] De ecclesiastica potestate, ed. Richard Scholz (Weimar, 1929), lib. II, c. 7 (p. 74).

[80] Lib. II, c. 10 (p. 286).

the assumption that infidels can rule Christians, he quotes a statement which he ascribes, in the indefinite plural reference typical with him,[81] to "the doctors," but which is, in fact, unmistakably drawn from St. Thomas' Article on infidel dominion. "Infidels," it reads, "are never to be given dominion over the faithful, for that would lead to scandal and danger to the faith. Existing rule of infidels may be tolerated by Christians, in order to avoid scandal. However, it can be destroyed by the Church, for infidels in virtue of their infidelity deserve to lose their power over Christians." Given this citation, it seems likely that the Article played a significant part in the coining of James' phrase, "by divine law, whatever may be the case with human." It was in the Article alone, of all earlier treatments of infidel dominion, that the ambivalence was complete and unresolved, and there alone, too, that the terms "divine law" and "human law" had been used.

The phrase, "by divine law, whatever may be the case with human," was to become the pivot of fourteenth-century treatment of the question. Alexander of St. Elpidio followed James to the letter,[82] and so did Alvarus Pelagius.[83] Conrad of Megenburg, elaborating the phrase, said that human law directed by divine law denies dominion to infidels, human law absolved from divine law permits it.[84] Guilelmus Amidani de Cremona used the phrase in its original form and went on to say, in imitation of Egidius, that in the possession of temporal things regeneration by the Church means more than paternal generation, so that one who is not a Christian "can justly be deprived of all his dominion." [85] The canonist Petrus Bertrandi said that there is a "twofold dominion, one by divine law and the other by human." The divine, which is God's, is "true, simple, and absolute"; and this means that all temporal power is subject to the spiritual. Legal, or human,

[81] Cf., e. g., his allusion to the theory of Egidius Romanus above.

[82] De potestate Christi vicarii sive summi pontifici magis in speciali, lib. II, c. 9 (Bibliotheca maxima pontifica, ed. Ioannus Thoma de Roccaberti [Rome, 1679–99], II, 26).

[83] De planctu ecclesiae, lib. I, c. 56 (Venice, 1560, p. 55[r]).

[84] De translacione Romani imperii, c. 21 (Richard Scholz, Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern [1327–1354], Analysen und Texte [Bibliothek des kg. Preuss. historischen Instituts in Rom, IX–X] [Rome, 1911], II, 315–16).

[85] Reprobatio errorum, ad 2 (Scholz, Unbekannte . . . , II, 18).

dominion, which God has conceded to men, "in respect to true divine dominion is not dominion but considered in itself is true," and insofar as it is justly acquired is not to be taken away without just cause by the pope or by anyone else.[86]

Ullmann says that Bertrandi "at long last furnished the long awaited theoretical justification for the practice that had grown up in connexion with the expropriation of goods held by heretics," [87] but in the light of the preceding tradition Bertrandi's originality seems very limited. Ullmann also takes occasion "to observe, firstly, how little canonistic scholarship was influenced by contemporary scholastic theology and philosophy, and secondly, that the Thomistic system of law made no impression on contemporary or later canonists;" [88] yet, although it is possible that Bertrandi arrived independently at his double standard, it appears probable that he was influenced, in an idea which Ullmann regards as important, by scholastic theologians and philosophers, and so, indirectly, by a part of the Thomistic system of law. Whether or not there was influence, it is evident that appreciation of the ambivalence in St. Thomas' view is essential to sound perspective on fourteenth-century theory.

[86] De origine iurisdictionum, seu de duabus potestatibus temporali, scilicet, ac spirituali, quibus universis Christianitatis populus regitur . . . , q. 4 (Tractatus universi iuris [Venice, 1584–86], II, 32[v]).

[87] Walter Ullmann, Medieval Papalism: the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists (London, 1949), p. 136. See also pp. 134–35.

[88] Ibid., p. 47.

STYLE AND THE MAN: THOMAS ADAMS, PROSE SHAKESPEARE OF PURITAN DIVINES

WILLIAM MULDER

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah

In 1629, emboldened to believe that "Our books may come to be seen where ourselves shall never be heard," Thomas Adams, London preacher, published his "Workes," a massive folio which brought together the sermons, meditations, and "other divine and moral discourses" of seventeen years.[1] "You see I have venturously trafficked with my poor talent in public," he says in his preface. "If the grain be good, it doth better in the market than in the garner. . . . If it were profitable being spoken, sure it cannot be unnecessary being written." The only other work to appear during his lifetime was a lengthy but close-reasoned "Exposition upon the Second Epistle General of St. Peter," an epistle which he considered "a magnificent and beautiful structure" having "many a column of comfort, many a door of hope, many a window of light." [2]

[1] A copy, "printed by Tho. Harper for John Grismand . . . to be sold at his shop in Ivie Lane, at the Sign of the Gunne," may be found in Houghton Library, Harvard University. The size of the work, running to 1240 pages, makes one appreciate the phrase "life and labors." The earliest of its sixty-three sermons is one delivered in 1612 at St. Paul's Cross, though Adams was at the time "Minister of the gospell" at Willington, Bedfordshire, not far from the village where John Bunyan was born. Houghton Library also possesses copies of more than a score of the sermons issued in small quartos from 1612 to 1626 under theatrical titles like The Gallant's Burden, The White Devil, The Black Saint, The Fatal Banquet, The Sinner's Passing Bell, Mystical Bedlam, The Soul's Sickness.

[2] An available edition is one "revised and corrected" by James Sherman, London, 1848. None of Adams' writings seems to have been reprinted until 1847, when the Rev. W. H. Stowell revived twelve sermons under the title The Three Divine Sisters, London and Edinburgh, "bringing them," as he says in his introduction, "out of the obscurity of two centuries," and hazarding the guess that no other edition would likely appear. But Adams was of sufficient interest to be included in Nichol's Series of Standard Divines, Puritan Period, as The Works of Thomas Adams: Being the Sum of His Sermons, Meditations, and Other Divine and Moral Discourses, 2 vols., Thomas Smith, editor, Edinburgh, 1861–2; a promised third volume in this set, which was to include a life by "Professor Angus," seems never to have materialized. Half a century later, the Cambridge Devotional Series issued a small volume of twelve sermons edited with an introduction by John Brown: The Sermons of Thomas Adams, the Shakespeare of Puritan Theologians, London, 1909. Most recently, in 1939, World's Classics included "The City of Peace" in its

His works of those few years have survived, but little is known of his life beyond what can be learned from the sermons themselves and from their prefaces and dedicatory epistles.[3] After graduating from Cambridge, where he took a B.A. degree in 1601/2 and an M.A. in 1606, Adams held two country charges, first in Bedfordshire, later in Buckinghamshire, before coming up to London in 1618, where he was preacher at St. Gregory's under St. Paul's Cathedral until 1623. By 1629 he was in charge of St. Benet's, Paul's Wharf, to whose parishioners he dedicated the 1629 edition of his "Workes." At times he preached at Paul's Cross and Whitehall, and he delivered sermons on several important occasions: in the chapel by Guildhall at the election of the Lord Mayor of London, in Christ's Church at the triennial visitation of the Lord Bishop of London, at Whitehall the week after "the departure of King James into blessedness" — the sermon appropriately called "The Sinner's Mourning Habit." At one time he also addressed the "Worthy Company of Gentlemen exercising arms in the artillery garden of London." The subject that day was "The Soldier's Honor," in which he found that war was "noble, just, and necessarie." It is interesting to speculate that Milton as a child of seven may have heard him on Trinity Sunday in 1615, when he delivered "The Spirituall Navigator Bound for the Holy Land" at St. Giles Without Cripplegate, where Milton's father was then resident.

In his dedications Adams addressed men like William, Earl of Pembroke, and Henry, Earl of Manchester, in most "inward" terms, suggesting they were friends rather than mere patrons. To Sir Henry Montague, lord chief justice of England, he dedicated "The Happiness of the Church" in 1618, a group of sermons preached in St. Gregory's. It is evident that, in Jacobean times, at least, he was a popular city preacher. Yet he tells his parishioners:

---

volume of Selected English Sermons, 16th–19th Centuries, edited with an introduction by Rt. Rev. Hensley Henson. Half a dozen of Adams' interesting characters appear in Gwendolyn Murphy's Cabinet of Characters, London, 1925. The citations in the present paper are, except where noted otherwise, from the 1861–2 two-volume edition of The Works.

[3] Adams is included in the Dictionary of National Biography, I, 102, the sketch by Alexander B. Grossart; W. H. Stowell's "Introduction" to The Three Divine Sisters provides a fuller account.

> I very well know the burden of preaching in this city. Many a minister comes to a parish with his veins full of blood, his bones of marrow; but how soon doth he exhaust his spirits, waste his vigour! And albeit there are many good souls, for whose sake he is content to make himself a sacrifice, yet there are some so unmerciful that after all his labour, would send him a beggar to his grave. I tell you but the fault of some. To you I am thankful.[4]

Neglect did eventually overtake him, however: we hear from him last in 1653, when in the preface to two sermons recovered only this past century, he speaks pathetically of the charity and mercy of almoners toward him in "this my necessitous and decrepit old age." [5] He must have died before the Restoration.

Adams was one of those Anglican preachers whom Laud called doctrinal Puritans because in the midst of an Arminian clergy they adhered to the strict Calvinism of the Reformers; the doctrine of predestination was out of favor at court after the death of James. If Adams seemed rigid in his creed that man by sin had offended God, an infinite majesty, and therefore deserved an infinite misery, he could also preach that Christ's sacrifice was sweetly tempered: as much blood was shed for the peasant in the field as for the prince in court. As there is no exemption of the greatest from misery, he taught, so no exception of the least from mercy. At any rate, he avoided doctrinaire controversy. He prized the unity of the church above all faction: "How they do wrangle in print and fight with their pens as soldiers with their pikes — all wounding the peace of the church. . . . It were certainly better for us to want some truth than to have no peace." [6]

He supported the episcopacy and upheld the divine right of the king. Some were made to rule, others to be ruled. Parity in church government he thought the "mother of confusion and disorder," and was contemptuous of those who would be priests without any order at all, "that refuse to be ordered," he says, in a bit of word play. Yet he sharply rebuked prelates who "lorded over God's heritage." If he became venomous at all, it was to

[4] The address "To my dearly beloved charge" immediately follows the dedications in the 1629 edition of the Workes.

[5] A. B. Grossart, D.N.B., I, 102.

[6] Quoted in Stowell, op. cit., lix.

denounce Rome on the one hand, the radical schismatics on the other:

> There is a perilous Gulf in the Roman sea (too many of our nation have found it). Dangerous swallowes about Amsterdam. It is good to fly from the Gulf of superstition, but withal to avoid the swallow of separation. . . . Straggling Dinahs seldom return but ravished home. . . . A man may perish as easily in the faire-colored waters of heresie as in the mud of iniquity.[7]

He hated Jesuits so rabidly that what was heroism in Protestant martyrs was in Jesuits "a vicious affectation which hath hardened them to such a prodigality of their bloods."

Except for the vestiges of Romanism in the Church of England, which he regarded as the true church universal, the wheat long hidden under the chaff, Adams could say that what mattered was "neither ceremony nor no ceremony, but the substantial, a new creature." How to lead a man to become the new creature, to live the godly life, was his concern. He was the divine moralist rather than the theologian. He urged practical piety, the covenant of good works as well as of grace:

> These times are sick of Adam's disease, that had rather eat of the tree of knowledge than of the tree of life: speculative Christians, not active and obedient saints. . . . If everyone would pluck a brand from this fire the flame would go out of itself. But whiles we cast in our iniquities as fuel, and blow it with the bellows of disobedience, we make it strong enough to consume us.[8]

He imagined his listeners complaining: "We cannot wear a garment in the fashion, nor take use for our money, nor drink with a good fellow, nor strengthen one word with the credit of an oath, but bitter invectives must be shot like porcupines' quills at these slight scapes!" [9]

He seems akin to medieval preachers in his moralizing; in arraigning the social abuses of the day he cast his bill of particulars in the categories of medieval moral science. The four C's of

[7] "The Spirituall Navigator Bound for the Holy Land," Workes (1629), 397.
[8] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 237.
[9] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 348.

his social criticism were the Court, the Church, the City, and the Country. In one sermon he gives each of them a number of disreputable daughters, as opposed to the fair daughters of devotion: the daughters of the Court are Pride, Avarice, and Luxury, whom he marries off to Templars, Cistercian monks, and Popish prelates, respectively; the daughters of the City are Fraud, Hypocrisy, Usury, and Sensuality, whom he marries off to Cheaters, Brain-sick separatists, Brokers, and Beasts of the forest; the daughters of the Country are Ignorance, Uncharitableness, and Ill custom, whom he marries off to Papists, Savages or Saracens, and Jews; and finally, the daughters of the Church are Poverty and Contempt, and he would have anyone take them who will.[10]

Adams, in short, denounced the vices of his age, however catalogued: the licentiousness of the court, the general corruption in town and country, the ravages made upon the living of the clergy. He lamented benefices bled by "custom, composition, enclosing, and depopulation," and looked back to the days of good Queen Elizabeth when "benefices go abegging as ministers do now." He attacked absentee clerics who had several fat cures "physicked by attorneys." "Are there none that mould their sermons with court dough, flattery? Cushion-chaplains that carry their mistresses fans, to keep the heat of reproof from their painted faces. . ." God's house was being perverted to a place of pastime, making "the house of praise a house of plays," and a house "not *laudis* but *fraudis*." The church got the worst help: servitors not good enough for the chamber fell into the chancel, from the buttery hatch to the pulpit. He that was not worthy enough to wait on his worship was good enough for God. Most shameful of all, the preachers who served the king's chapel winked at "idolatry in Bethel" and failed to reprove "the iniquity of Gilgal, the country of oppression" because they themselves fed "at an oppressor's table." "Religion is made but policy's stirrup, to get up and ride on the back of pleasure." [11]

Adams' indictments ranged the social register, sparing no one: He opposed duelling and its defenders, those who, being chal-

[10] "The Sacrifice of Thankfulness," Works, I, 126 ff.
[11] Works, I, 107, 346, 384, 385, 452, 463, 469.

lenged, wrote their minds "with a pen of steel, in the ink of blood, on the white paper of man's life." Magistrates should not sell "your connivance and withal your conscience, where you should give your punishment." Lust had altogether too many promoters: "Among all, those in print do most mischief . . . . books of epicurism and sensuality. Ovid's Amatories have bright and trite covers when the book of God lies in a dusty corner." [12]

Of an aristocratic temper, Adams believed that "God allows difference of persons. He ordains some to rule and others to obey," and he found it "a savage and popular humour to malign and inveigh against men in eminent places." The rhyme, "When Adam delved and Eve span, Who was then a gentleman?" seemed to him to be "made among Jack Straw's followers," and to savor "of rebellious discontent." Yet Adams saw that "the sweat of the labourer's brow is made an ointment to supple the joints of Pride. . . . Whiles the Gentleman and the Citizen shuffle the cards together, they deal the poor Commons but a very ill game." And he cried bitterly against economic oppressions: "The unmerciful monopolies of courtiers, the unreasonable prices of merchants, the hoards of grain with cormorants, the advantages made of the poor's necessities, unconscionable fines, and rents, wringing the last penny from their purses and drop of blood from their hearts. . ." [13]

He recognized the exceptions: the industrious citizens, the well-doing yeomanry, a portion of the clergy, and not a few men in highest rank, the "truly reverend and godly prelates of this land" whom he honored for their "impartial proceedings." He was acute enough to see that

> wickedness is not bound to wealthiness; and arrogancy or lewdness may be incident to poverty and baseness. . . A peasant ill-nurtured is also ill-natured. A great gentleman will shew more humble courtesy than a thrashing hind or a toiling ploughman. . . . You shall have a paltry cottage send up more black smoke than a goodly manor. It is not wealth, therefore, but vice, that excludes men out of heaven.[14]

[12] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 185.
[13] "The Devil's Banquet," Works, I, 24, 153; "The Gallant's Burden," I, 300.
[14] "The Sacrifice of Thankfulness," Works, I, 140.

II

In his preoccupation with private and public morality in "these Machiavellian days," as he called them, and in his insistence on high standards of conduct, Adams, however loyal to the Establishment, was plainly a Puritan. "All our preaching is but to beget your praying." But it was with far from Puritan plainness that he called his hearers to godliness. He knew the music as well as the text of the great song of salvation and in his search for an "answerable style" he did not hesitate to play all the stops of seventeenth century prose. "Do not the Jeremiahs of these days mourn like turtles, as well as sing like larks?" he asks, and then in scorn: "Or will not these mournings, menaces, querulations, stir your hearts, because they are derived from God through us, his organ pipes, as if they had lost their vigor by the way?" [15] Metaphorically he poses the central problem of religious communication:

> Our Saviour lyes here (not dead, but living) but *who shall roll away the stone for us?* open a passage to our understanding? The impediment is not in *Objecto percipiendo*, but in *Organo percipiendi*; not in the object to be seene, but in our organ or instrument of seeing it: not in the *Sunne,* but in the dimme thickness of our sight.[16]

To roll away the stone and reach the understanding challenged his learning and his art as a preacher, that he might, according to the hierarchy of faculties, convey truth, bring peace, through a "conformity of affection to reason, of reason to grace . . . . faith leading the understanding, the understanding guiding the will, the will ruling the operative powers, and Christ Jesus governing all." [17] In the multiform appeal which any one of his sermons represents, reason may be taken as appealing to judgment, similitudes to fancy, orderly method to memory, and homely application to conscience. To convince by sound argument and to win attention by arresting illustration were the heart of his rhetoric. His passionate desire was "to convert the elect, convince the reprobate";

[15] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 349.
[16] "The Spirituall Navigator," Workes (1629), 392.
[17] "The City of Peace," Rt. Rev. Hensley Henson, ed., Selected English Sermons, 16th–19th Centuries, London, 1939, p. 106.

to have his words "pierce like a goad, be as a sharp stroke to the conscience, that howsoever the smart is neglected, it leaveth a print behind it." That was Christ's ability with even a question.[18]

But Adams realized that his auditors were not "broad glasses, but narrow-necked vials; and then best receive the balm of life when it is stilled from the limbec of preaching with a soft fire, and a gentle pouring in." [19]

> God doth sometimes draw men to him *suis ipsorum studiis*, by their own delights and studies . . . as fishermen fishes, with such baits as may be somewhat agreeable to them. . . . Doth Augustine love eloquence? Ambrose shall catch him at a sermon.[20]

Diverse natures demanded different treatment: it required the hammer of the law to break the stony heart of rebellion, the sweet balm of the gospel to supple the broken conscience; some hearts, like nettles, would sting if touched gently, but could stand rough handling; others, like briars, would wound the grasping hand of reproof but yield willingly to the touch of exhortation. "One must be washed with gentle baths, whilst another must have his ulcers cut with lances." [21]

To win others to God required learning. "Spiritual physicians, no less than the secretaries of nature, must have knowledge and art." Let art be "an obedient Hagar." [22] God had given the preacher liberty in his calling "not only nakedly to lay down the truth, but with the helps of invention, wit, art, to prevent the loathing of his *manna*." If his congregation were only "sanctified ears," like Cornelius or Lydia, mere affirmation were enough. But they were more like "Belgic armies . . . so many hearers, so many humours" that all the minister's helps could scarcely help one soul to heaven.[23] Adams berated "sottish enthusiasts" who condemned all learning and premeditation because they felt it tied the Holy Ghost to a pen and ink-horn. He felt they ran away with their sermons as horses with an empty cart. It was true Christ had chosen fishermen and made them fishers of men; but

[18] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 340–1.
[19] Ibid., I, 366.
[20] "The Way Home," Works, II, 17–18.
[21] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 348.
[22] Ibid., I, 386–7.
[23] Ibid., I, 348.

he gave them a calling and virtues for it. It was a singular action, not to be taken as a general pattern: "As if men were the more faulty, the more fit; the more silly, the more sufficient. Christ so furnished his disciples with knowledge and language that the people wondered at their wisdom." [24] There were "high points for forward scholars, easier lessons for those in a lower form." It was wrong to preach riddles and paradoxes, and frivolous to call such "a deep sermon." Popish teachers, suppressing the words and stifling the sense, hid away the gold and threw the people the bag.[25]

The Spartan discipline of so many Puritan preachers, the plain style, seemed to Adams itself a danger. While intending that nothing should detract the mind from the truth being presented, the plain style might actually fail to do justice to an idea, or might even misrepresent it. To convey great or complex impressions required aids to the imagination; on the other hand, to convey things simple and common, platitudes for example, required a presentation that would shock the mind into attention lest their very familiarity breed indifference. To be sure, Adams had the Puritan distrust of the five senses, "the Cinque Ports where all the great traffic of the devil is taken in, . . . the pores whereby Satan conveys in the stinking breath of temptation." [26] Yet, with precaution, and for hallowed ends, God's minister could appeal to them, "That you may conceive things more spiritual and remote by passions nearer to sense." [27] It is thus less shocking to find in a Puritan collection a sermon titled "The Crucifix," for it is "a fair and lively crucifix, cut by the hand of a most exquisite carver — not to amaze our corporal lights with a piece of wood, brass, or stone, curiously engraven, to the increase of a carnal devotion; but to present to the eye of the conscience the grievous passion and gracious compassion of our Saviour." [28]

Scripture descended to men's capacities and in their own familiar terms spoke to their shallow understandings. "The royal preacher, Solomon, draws the curtain of the world, shows you all

[24] Ibid., I, 386–7.
[25] Loc. cit.
[26] "A Generation of Serpents," Works, I, 72.
[27] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 243.
[28] "The Crucifix," Works, II, 422.

the delicates of her table: They are detected that they might be detested." [29] But there was danger that some sins were taught simply by being named, and occasionally Adams, "for modesty's sake," buries the particulars of Lust in silence.[30] Even Scripture was capable of misleading the carnal-minded: "God hath set up these sins," he says concerning some transgressions for which Israel was punished, "as crocodiles to terrify us; and we entertain them as sirens to seduce us." [31] Music, if associated with the jollity that deafened the conscience, was evil; but he found the tolling of a heavy bell for the languishing Christian drawing near his end "a custom not unworthy of approbation. . . . The passing-bell puts into the sick man a sense of mortality." [32] Color was a thing of earth, an ephemeral quality of jewels and russets and wine and ladies. "Man's corporal eye sees nothing but color. . . . It is the understanding, the soules interior eye that conceives and perceives the latent virtues." Color fades; the splendor of things is decayed. "If the world, like aged and wrinkled Helen, should contemplate her own face in a glasse, she would wonder that for her beauties sake Troy should be sack'd and burned, man's soule endangered to eternal fire." [33]

> It is but color that delights you, ye worldlings. What babes are we to be taken with these colors that only please the eye, or the sensuall part of man and harm the soul: like children that play with glass till they cut their fingers. . . . No matter is more apt to make mirrors or receive painting than glass. So men decke the world, as the Israelites did their calf, and then superstitiously dote upon it, as Pigmalion on his carved stone.[34]

Colors had their legitimate uses, of course: a painter could draw a beautiful picture or limn deformities and devils — as long as he was not like the flatterer who, ignorant of goodness, lays fair colors upon foul iniquities.[35]

[29] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 220.
[30] "The Rage of Oppression," Works, I, 89.
[31] Exposition on the Second Epistle of St. Peter, quoted in Stowell, op. cit., liv.
[32] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 331.
[33] "The Spirituall Navigator," Workes (1629), 406.
[34] Ibid., 407.
[35] Works, I, 504.

III

Adams placed the integrity of the preacher at the very center of his art. A minister that "prescribed well in the pulpit, but lived disorderly out of it" was "like a young scribbler, what he writes fair with his hand, his sleeve comes after and blots it." [36] Adams, we may be reasonably sure, was too godly a man to do any such blotting. To what extent did he "write fair"?

"A man who really believes in a just and omnipotent, a merciful and omniscient God," says J. Middleton Murry, "has for his familiar companion a conception and an emotion which are truly tremendous. . . . When an old Hebrew prophet wrote, 'And the Lord said,' he had done everything. The phrase is overwhelming. Two thousand years of Christian civilization bend our minds to these words; we cannot resist them." [37] Adams, like every religious artist, strove to match the concepts and imagery already held by his listeners — to compass the magnitude and depth of their faith. Certainly he had the advantage of an audience predisposed to the kind of emotional and intellectual experience he was attempting to bring them. It helps to explain what might otherwise seem extravagant elements in his art.

His sermons for the most part follow a scheme inherited from classical and medieval rhetoric: a logical ordering of the ideas explicit in the text arranged by the nicest ingenuities of balance and antithesis. Occasionally he frees himself from this rigid, traditional framework to follow the method, more popular by his time, which clarified the text, raised the doctrine, followed it with the reasons or proofs, and concluded with the uses — evidence that he was a transitional figure working in both old and new manners. But in the main he imposes on the chosen text a topical ordering, sometimes logical, sometimes purely verbal. Scholastic and Euphuist join talents.

The schema, announced at the outset of the sermon and furbished with alliterative tags to aid the memory, serves as an auditory diagram and, when printed in tabular form, as a visual aid. It reveals the unmistakable structure of the sermon, its

[36] Ibid., I, 390.
[37] The Problem of Style, London, 1925, p. 127.

"architectural stability." [38] The schematic habit, often flowering in elaborate patterns, finds typical expression in "The Way Home," for example, a sermon on Matthew II:12: "And being warned of God in a dream that they should not return to Herod, they departed into their own country another way." It falls into two major divisions: I. An informing: a word. II. A performing: a work. "God gives the word, the magi do the work. . . . God doth inform, and they perform." The first division has three parts: 1. The men, 2. The manner, 3. The matter. Each of these parts is further sub-divided: The manner, which is in a dream, becomes natural, preternatural, and supernatural dreams. Preternatural dreams become dreams "ad errorum" and "ad terrorum." And so forth.[39] A discourse on I Peter IV:19 develops an antithesis:

> A true Christian's life is one day of three meals, and every meal hath in it two courses. His first meal is to be born a sinner, and to be new-born a saint. . . . His second meal is to do well and to suffer ill. . . . The third meal is to die a temporal death, to live an eternal life.[40]

In "The World of Madmen" Adams divides one text into nothing more than a comma, a colon, and a period: similitudes of man's setting out, his journeying through life, and his final descent to death.[41] And in "The Black Saint," having outlined a great number of sub-divisions, he promises his brevity in the sermon itself shall make some amends for the proliferation.[42]

Not unrelated to this schema is the so-called figure sermon in which a central analogy becomes almost a full-blown allegory. Adams is a vivid narrator. In "The Spirituall Navigator Bound for the Holy Land" (a religious counterpart of Elizabethan voyage literature) the world is a sea, whose dangers are similitudes of spiritual dangers; in "The Soul's Sickness" bodily ills are likened to moral distempers and the analogy is closely applied in the

[38] The phrase is W. Fraser Mitchell's, used in his extensive discussion of the schemata in English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson: a Study of Its Literary Aspects, London, 1932, passim.

[39] "The Way Home," Works, II, 17, 18.

[40] Quoted in Stowell, op. cit., xliii.

[41] "Mystical Bedlam, or the World of Madmen," Works, I, 254.

[42] "The Black Saint," Works, I, 501.

description of diagnosis, progress, and cure of each disease: Envy is consumption, Inconstancy a kind of staggers, Idleness the leprosy. In "The Sinner's Passing Bell" the analogy is between physic and divinity: God's word is the balm, the ministers the physicians of the soul, the people their patients. In "England's Sickness" man's soul is a "beauteous damsel" and her suitors are the world (a blustering captain), the flesh (a homeborn fellow who hopes to speed for old acquaintance), and the devil (an old dotard); Christ is the desirable bridegroom. In "The Fatal Banquet" the figure is carried through four sermons: Sin, a harlot, is hostess; the Seven Deadly Sins are bidders to Satan's feast of stolen waters and secret bread, which are like ill medicines. In another sermon, Peace, after a number of Biblical personifications, is represented as a city (London its prototype) with walls of Unity and Concord and four gates — Innocence, Patience, Benefaction, and Satisfaction — which become Bishopsgate, Ludgate, Aldgate, and Cripplegate; its governor is God, its law the law of Christ; its palace is a temple, its river Prosperity; the life of the citizens is Love, and so on. In "Politic Hunting" the wicked become the hunters of men with various evil types as their hounds and the poor their illegitimate prey; Adams exhorts the hunters to go after legitimate prey instead: after the wild boar, or the depopulator; the fox, or crafty cheater; the wolf, or usurer; the badger, or engrosser of corn; the bull, or papists. Adams' indignant imagination found endless figures for evil. In a sermon appropriately titled "Generation of Serpents" men are vipers, their sins poisons.[43]

These analogies are reminiscent of Latimer's famous card sermon, in which "hearts is trump." Sometimes pathological in their detail, not infrequently lurid, they are certainly lively and familiar and must have given their listeners some of the flavor they enjoyed in the theatre, particularly since so many of the sermons include fullfleshed characters which go beyond mere personification of virtues and vices and make the sinner interesting for his own sake. Adams can dash off a character in the manner of Overbury, whose creations appeared only the year

[43] "The Spirituall Navigator," Workes (1629); the other sermons may all be found in the 1861–2 edition.

before "The Spirituall Navigator" (1615), in which Adams presents his first company. In "Mystical Bedlam," the same year, Adams describes the Busybody:

> The Busybody all will confess a madman; for he frisks up and down, like a nettled horse, and will stand on no ground. . . . He admits all men's businesses into his brain but his own; and comes not home for his own till he hath set all his neighbours' ploughs a-going. He hurries up and down, like Jehu the son of Nimshi in his chariot, or as a gallant in his new caroch, driving as if he were mad. He loves not to sleep in his own doors; and hinders the commonwealth with frivolous questions. He is a universal solicitor for every man's suit, and would talk a lawyer himself mad. There is not a boat wherein he hath not an oar, nor a wheel wherein he will not challenge a spoke. He lives a perpetual affliction to himself and others, and dies without pity, save that they say, It is pity he died no sooner. He is his neighbours' *malus genius*, and a plague to melancholy. He is the common supervisor to all the wills made in his parish; and when he may not be a counsellor, he will be an intelligencer. If you let him not in to interrupt, he will stand without to eavesdrop. He is a very madman; for he takes great pains without thanks, without recompense, of God or man, or his own conscience. He is luxurious of business that concerns him not. Lay hands on him, shackle him; there are some less mad in bedlam.[44]

Adams keeps his eye on the subject. His sketches are not simply flashes of wit; he is as addicted to cleverness as his contemporaries, but his sincerity redeems his cleverness. He describes how certain men behave to convince others of their sins. His characters — a whole gallery of portraits — are a skilfully employed homiletic device, an integral part of his sermons, but their art would give him claim to literary stature outside the pulpit.[45]

Closely connected with the character is Adams' habit of now and again inserting bits of dialogue and revealing, incidentally, a flair for the dramatic. He carries on an imaginary conversation with Epicure: "I would fain speak not only of him, but with him."

> "Can you tend it, belly-god? What is your name?"
> "Epicure."

[44] "Mystical Bedlam," Works, I, 284.

[45] Mitchell, op. cit., discusses Adams' use of the character as an advance over the moral *descriptio*.

"Epicure? What is that? Speak not so philosophically, but tell us, in plain dealing, what are you?"

"A lover of pleasure more than of God."

"Ho, a good fellow, a merry man, a madman! What is your summum bonum?"

"Pleasure."

"Wherein consists it? Rehearse the articles of your belief."

And Epicure recites his indulgences in "delicacies, junkets, quotidian feasts, suckets, . . . soft beds . . . and midnight revels" at great length.[46]

IV

The schematic arrangement of thought which gives the sermons their general design also marks much of the prose itself, determining the form of sentence and paragraph. Balance and antithesis are its chief characteristics, a strait-jacket parallelism that strives for grammatical and structural correspondence or contrast of word to word and phrase to phrase and sound to sound. It results in a style pointed, sententious, aphoristic, that can be ingenious and acute yet serious. Alliteration and word-play inevitably abound: "As many minds as men, as many sects as cities, as many gospels as gossips."

> This strain of David's music or psalmody consists of two notes — one mournful, the other mirthful; the one a touch of distress, the other of redress: which directs our course to an observation of misery and of mercy, of grievous misery, of gracious mercy. There is desolation and consolation in one verse: a deep dejection . . . a happy deliverance.[47]

It is the rhetoric of wit in the seventeenth century meaning of that term. The phrase "variety of teachers" opposes "verity of doctrine." We get "haven of heaven" and "Mary traveled in her travail." And inversions: "Whosoever can show you the way better, yet certainly none can show you a better way." "As their end is damnation, so their damnation is without end." Balance and antithesis become second nature, a habit of mind: "There is

[46] "Mystical Bedlam," Works, I, 284.

[47] "Christ's Star," Works, II, 216.

no disaster to the members but for disorder in the manners." "Let as many as would be one spirit with the Lord Jesus hate to be one flesh with a Siren." Adams gives his own best explanation of the effective use of antithesis when he describes Solomon's sayings as

> aphorisms containing for the most part a pair of cross and thwart sentences, handled rather by collation than relation, whose conjunction is disjunctive. The proverbs are not joined with an *et* but an *at*, with a *but* rather than with an *and*. It stands in the middle, like a rudder or oar, to turn the boat another way. It is like the sudden clap of a serjeant on a gallant's shoulder. He is following his lusts, full scent and full cry; the arrest strikes him with a *but*, and all is at a loss.[48]

Adams knew the work of Lyly and Seneca and read the Christian Fathers and the ancient masters of rhetoric. His frequent rhyming pairs of phrases usually spring from Latin originals: "*Schola crucis, schola lucis*: there is no such school instructing, as the cross inflicting." "The former sick were *tumidi*, these are *timidi*; they were bold to all evil, these are fearful to all good." Yet on occasion he is perfectly capable of bursting the bonds of this schematic tyranny, of breaking out of the Euphuistic playground of glittering devices into an open meadow to fly the kite of his imagination in a freer rhythm across the sky:

> Oh how is the splendor and glory of the world bated and impaired since the original creation! The sky lookes dusky: the Sunne puts forth a drowsy head. . . . The Moon looks pale, as if she were sick with age: and the starres doe but twinckle; as if they were dimme and looked upon the earth with spectacles. The colors of the rainbow are not so radiant: and the whole earth shewes but like a garment often dyed, destitute of the native hew.[49]

But he is equally characteristic in the sententious style, fit vehicle for his copious learning, which lends itself to his fondness for fable and anecdote, proverb and allusion to medieval and classical lore. He ranges from Homer to a current street ballad: "When shall we eat white bread? When the puttock is dead."

[48] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 216.
[49] "The Spirituall Navigator," Workes (1629), 406–7.

Poets, Church Fathers, Greek mythology, Pliny, an obscure treatise on storks' mating habits, bestiary, lapidary, Scripture — all are grist to his mill. Biblical allusion, of course, is most constant:

> There is no treasure so much enricheth our mind as learning, no learning so applicable to our life as history, no history so directing as example, no example so worthy our observation as that which is written by God's own finger.[50]

In passages of exposition, Adams' sentences, often marvels of compression, appeal to the intellect. In passages of exhortation, the sentences lengthen their stride, lay on colors, tones, cadences, and appeal to the emotions. But whether employing the rhetoric of wit or the rhetoric of persuasion, he gives an impression of controlled vitality. The vitality electrifies the diction, a diction creative and exciting, often a discovery. His translations of Latin are not slavish: *vita brevis hominum* becomes "man's short and brittle life." His adjectives are precise and distinctive; observe the participles in his description of pride: "Feathered on the crown, cork'd at the heels, light all over; stretching her legs and spreading her wings like an ostrich, with ostentation of great flight." He shows us "surly and sharking bailiffs, that can set a rankling tooth in the poor tenants' ribs," "long-nosed, hook-handed brokers," "light-fingered tradesmen." He is "crop-sick of ceremonies." He speaks of souls as "incurvate and oppressed." An imagist poet would like his description of the Jesuit: "He sits like the raven on a dead bough." This is a decided contrast to "the lutulent, spumy, maculatory waters of sin, either squeezed from the spongy clouds of our corrupt natures, or surging from the contagious springs of temptation." He effectively juxtaposes short, simple adjectives and polysyllabled ones: lawyers' "quirks and delays are like the corrosive plasters of an unconscionable leech that turns a small green wound to an incurable fistula by poisoning and exulceration of it for filthy lucre." And again: "A lean, macilent, affamished body, a soul self-beaten black and blue." Often the adjective is startling: "The labourer's hire cries

[50] Exposition on the Second Epistle General of St. Peter, quoted in Stowell, op. cit., liv.

in the gripolous landlord's hand," "pursy riches," "oraculous voice of the minister." At one time the world "lies bedrid, and fetching a thick, sick, and short breath." At another, it is "rank and manured with sin."

Adams is not averse to word play and pun: ". . . and were they indeed angels without angels in their purse they should find cold entertainment." "Pride is of the feminine gender . . . . she is both painted and pointed together." "Uncivil civil wars." "To define the local place of hell, it is too deep for me." "The rich feast, the poor fast; the dogs dine, the poor pine." Epithets are sharp line-drawings, frequently with the sting of invective. It would be a fascinating employment to compile a "Satan Sampler" from Puritan sermons; in Adams, Satan is by turns "subtle falconer," "an ill surgeon," "that arch pirate," "picklock of virginities," "merchant of souls."

Verbs are vigorous, concrete rather than abstract, specific rather than general: Christ "thunders" Paul from his horse; sinners are "fleshed" with wickedness; "there slugs Idleness; there slides by the meagre ghost of malice." Some ministers "ruffle in the robes of preferment." "Didst thou trudge with contention?" "Hast thou foraged with oppression?" "Clap'd them the hand of the covenant." "The busybody . . . frisks up and down like a nettled horse." Speaking of fables, Adams says, "I need not moral it." The covetous "Italianates his conscience, Romanises his estate." Any paragraph is like a slab of fruitcake, full of linguistic nuts and raisins.

To think and speak metaphorically is second nature with him. Hardly an idea in the whole of the sermons is not illustrated concretely. "Of all our helps," he says, "there is none that creeps with better insinuation, or leaves behind a deeper impression on the conscience than a fit comparison." [51] Unlike the ordinary Puritan preacher, he was not reluctant to use metaphor as well as the more trusted similitude, believing only that metaphor should not run "like a coach on four wheels when to go, like a man, on two sound legs is sufficient." [52] Sometimes his attempt to be graphic leads to ludicrous result: in his personification of Repentance, he says,

[51] Loc. cit.

[52] "The Sinner's Passing Bell," Works, I, 376.

"There is not a tear falls from her, but an angel holds a bottle to catch it." At other times the similitude is a happy one:

> The wounded conscience runs like the stricken deer with the arrow of death in her ribs, from thicket to thicket, from shelter to shelter, but cannot change her pain with her place.[53]

At times a simile expands and becomes an illustration indulged in for its own sake, as in his likening the sudden change that comes over the guests at sin's fatal banquet to an unlooked for storm that turns their joy into mourning:

> As in a fair summer's morning, when the lark hath called up the sun, and the sun the husbandman; when the earth hath opened her shop of perfumes, and a pleasant wind fans coolness through the air; when every creature is rejoiced at the heart, on a sudden the furious winds burst from their prisons, the thunder rends the clouds, and makes way for the lightning, and the spouts of heaven stream down showers: a hideous tempest sooner damps all the former delight than a man's tongue can well express it.[54]

He can manage a conceit with skill: One good man is like a pair of manacles to the hands of God, keeping him from the defulmination of judgment. Always Adams strives to be familiar as well as vivid, and he draws his comparisons from bodily functions, occupations, the daily life of town and country as often as from history and mythology. Like Emily Dickinson, he "domesticates the universe" to his homely uses: the world has bitter teats that we may not suck too long on it; the stars look dim as if they wear spectacles; an irreligious person is like a loose tooth in the head, of little use, much trouble; gentlemen in these cold countries have very good stomachs — they can devour three or four plump parsonages; the busybody can keep no secret in without the hazard of his buttons; they that go to law for trifles are like nice people that continually lie in the hands of physicians for pimples and warts; certain doctrines stick like a bone in the throat which will neither up nor down; a crew of oaths flies like a flight of dismal ravens, croaking the plague; sin runs like a cold rheum over the conscience.

[53] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 240.
[54] Ibid., I, 220.

Adams draws his metaphors boldly and with economy: when the heart is a hollow bell, the tongue is a loud and lewd clapper; Circe's cup fats men against the slaughter-day of judgment; the wicked, for the slight breakfast of this world, lose the Lamb's supper of glory. The sea of glass spoken of in Revelation is the "Laver of regeneration," but also the ford through which every man must pass. Lustful eyes are trapdoors to the heart. "If God's finger touch the body, we groan under the weight; let his whole hand lie on the soul, we feel nothing." Death is an ordnance which God will shoot against man. Security is the very suburbs of hell. Adams can speak of the handkerchief of comfort, the ear-wax of partiality, the incense of gratitude, the garment of damnation. His personifications have the same combination of freshness and familiarity: Night for the tormented person is a nurse of anguished thoughts, at whose dugs sorrows and dreams lie continually sucking. Conscience plucks Lust by the sleeve and would have a word with him, but he bids her meet him at fifty. Pride is haughty and walks as if at every step it could knock out a star in heaven. Less sharp, but effective through sheer accumulation, are instances of multiple imagery: Sins, the bidders to the fatal banquet, have their divine uses — they "are but rubbish to scour the vessels of God's house; apothecaries to minister us bitter drugs, not able to put in one dram more than God our physician prescribes; shepherds' dogs with their teeth beaten short, to hunt us to the sheepfolds of peace." [55]

Adams is hell's local colorist, though not professing to be a native of the region. Not even Jonathan Edwards surpasses his evocation of its terrors:

> I know this earth is a dungeon in regard of heaven, yet a heaven in respect of hell; we have misery enough here, it is a mercy to what is there. Think of a gloomy, hideous, and deep lake, full of pestilent damps and rotten vapours, as thick as clouds of pitch, more palpable than the fogs of Egypt, that the eye of the sun is too dull to pierce them, and his heat too weak to dissolve them. Add hereunto a fire flashing in the reprobate's face, which shall yield no more light than with a glimpse to shew him the torments of others, and others the torments of himself; yet withal of so violent a burning, that, should

[55] Ibid., I, 158.

it glow on mountains of steel, it would melt them like hills of snow. . . .[56]

He pictures a man "tumbled down to a bottom more full of true miseries than his promontory was of false delights. . . ."

a vast charnel-house, hung round with lamps burning blue and dim, set in hollow corners, whose glimmering serves to discover the hideous torments; all the ground, instead of green rushes, strewed with funeral rosemary and dead men's bones; some corpses standing upright in their knotted winding-sheets, others rotted in their coffins, which yawn wide to vent their stench; there the bare ribs of a father that begat him, here the hollow skull of a mother that bare him; — how direful and amazing are these things to sense! [57]

If he paints hell in thick oils on a lurid canvas, heaven he limns in water colors:

All her garments are green and orient; all her paths be milk, her words oracles, and her works miracles. . . . Her breath is sweeter than the new-blown rose; millions of souls lie sucking their life from it: and the smell of her garments is like the smell of Lebanon. Her smiles are more reviving than the vertumnal sunshine: and her favours, like seasonable dews, spring up flowers and fruits wheresoever she walks.[58]

Adams may lavish his rhetoric on depictions of heaven and hell, but England is his love: "Only England hath lain, like Gideon's fleece, dry and secure, when the rain of judgments hath wetted the whole earth, and when drought was on the whole earth besides, it was wet with the dew of heaven." The nation was the happy model of his City of Peace, which he celebrates in his best-known figure sermon. Were the world turned into a ring, London would be its diamond. Prosperity is the river to the city, that "like a loving Meander winds itself about, throwing his silver arms upon her sides; ebbing slowly, but flowing merrily, as if he longed to embrace his love." But the inhabitants requite this river with ungrateful impiety and use the ocean of God's bounty as they do the Thames:

[56] Ibid., I, 241.
[57] Ibid., I, 243.
[58] "The City of Peace," Henson, Selected Sermons, 124.

> It brings us in all manner of provision: clothes to cover us, fuel to warm us, food to nourish us, wine to cheer us, gold to enrich us: and we in recompense, soil it with our rubbish, filth, common sewers, and such excretions. . . . It comes flowing in with our commodities, and we send it laden back with our injuries.[59]

Adams had more than a vivid pictorial imagination; he had what T. S. Eliot calls "auditory imagination, the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and feeling, invigorating every word." [60] It required not an ear so much as a metronome to write his skilfully balanced sentences; but it did require an ear, a finer musicianship, to write a line like this: "Oh, how is the splendor and glory of the world bated and impaired since the original creation." Or a passage reminiscent of Browne:

> It is a foolish dream to hope for immortality and a long-lasting name by a monument of brass or stone. It is not dead stones, but living men, that can redeem thy good remembrance from oblivion. . . . Only thy noble and Christian life makes every man's heart thy tomb, and turns every tongue into a pen to write thy deathless epitaph.[61]

He understands the management of the sentence that is like a high-spirited horse straining in the traces but reined in by a skilful driver:

> A wicked man runs headlong in the night of his unwaked security after his wonted sports, and because he keeps his old path, which never interrupted him with any obstacles, he nothing doubts but to speed as he had wont; but his enemy hath digged a pit in his way, and in he topples, even to the depths of hell.[62]

Occasionally the harmonious roll of the syllabication is so irresistible that the mind ceases to attempt to follow what is being said and leans back simply to listen:

> If in Authoritie committed to inferior Magistrates (the persuasions of my heart excuseth the higher powers; and the impartiall proceed-

[59] Ibid., 118.
[60] Quoted in S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action, New York, 1939, p. 186.
[61] "God's Bounty," Works, I, 153.
[62] "The Fatal Banquet," Works, I, 216.

> ings of the truely Reverend and godly Prelates of this land testifies it) there were not some connivance, (God forbid Patronizing) of these enormities for some sinister respects: the Sirens about our River of Thames should be (if not sent swimming to Gravesend, yet at least) taken in at Bridewell staires.[63]

Passages like these, in which Adams is closer to Hooker and Taylor than to Lyly, have a kinetic quality: the language creates its own emotion. It seems eminently suited for religious communication, capable of conditioning listeners to further emotional suggestion — a quality to be expected in an Anglo-Catholic, but hardly in a reforming Calvinist. Adams' prose manifests, moreover, a larger rhythm — a rising and falling in the sermon as a whole, partly the result of alternating exposition and exhortation within each division of the sermon, and partly a reflection of his temper. Adams does not mount to climactic peroration. After hellfire and damnation comes subsidence, the "calm of mind, all passion spent." His concluding passages usually speak holy joy. He does not leave the worm gnawing the conscience of his hearers. He leads them beside still waters, for he would feed and fatten them on the mercies of God. "I end with a consolation," he says in "Christ's Star," "for who can shut up this story with a terror?" This is typical of a man to whom Paul, man of zeal, and Barnabas, son of consolation, were ideal ministers. Learning, fervency, and compassion, a resistless appeal, animate the man and his style.

In his own day, as he notes in a preface to one of his sermons, some considered Adams a "trifle fanciful, and given to allegories and rhetorical flourishes."[64] He was perhaps too learned to achieve the simple eloquence of his plain style brethren, but his imagery does not stray far from human nature. Southey called him "the prose Shakespeare of Puritan theologians, scarcely inferior to Fuller in wit or to Taylor in fancy." Haller says he was no Shakespeare but "a late and extreme though brilliant example" of the persistence of older devices and traditions. Mitchell justly concludes that he was "a fellow worker with the greater writers in breaking down the tyranny of the schematic patterns in the

[63] "The Spirituall Navigator," Workes (1629), 402.
[64] "The Divells Banket" (1614), quoted in Mitchell, op. cit., 215.

interests of a less pointed, more sonorous style." [65] He is, surely, a convincing illustration that the older Puritan sermon contains many literary rewards.

[65] Southey, quoted in John Brown, Puritan Preaching, New York, 1900, p. 89; William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, New York, 1938, p. 31; W. Fraser Mitchell, op. cit., 221, 224.

THE TWELVE GODS AT COS

THE group known as the "Twelve Gods" possessed a δωδεκάθεον at Cos and had their own priest.[1] But the gods' names are nowhere explicitly enumerated. They can only be recovered (1) from observation of the roster of the Twelve Gods elsewhere in Greece and (2) from conclusions as to the most important gods at Cos. The "canonical" group in Greece generally was: Aphrodite, Apollo, Ares, Artemis, Athena, Demeter, Hephaestus, Hera, Hermes, Hestia, Poseidon, Zeus. But of these twelve, Ares and Hephaestus are nowhere found at Cos on either epigraphic or literary evidence. It is therefore unlikely that they belong in the Twelve.

No doubt this was the reasoning followed by R. Herzog [2] in suggesting these candidates: Zeus, Apollo, Poseidon, Hermes, Dionysus, Heracles, Hera, Athena, Demeter, Artemis; "weniger sicher" Rhea, Leto, Hestia, Aphrodite, Hecate; "schwerlich" Charites, Moirai. With the first ten candidates there need be no disagreement, as the deities are tolerably well represented at Cos. I suggest that there is no reason to regard Aphrodite, one of the "canonical" group, as any less certain than the others. Her claim is strengthened by the possession of an Ἀφροδίσιον,[3] and one scarcely believes that the divine inhabitant of a temple of such importance at Cos would not get into the Twelve Gods.[4]

As to the twelfth and last god, Hestia of the canonical group has not much claim at Cos.[5] Her claim is considerably weaker than the surprisingly well-represented Hecate's. Most of Hecate's testimony is in the form of a prodigious number of theophoric names from this part of the Greek world, and not least at Cos,[6] but she also appears on inscriptions.[7] All in all her testimonia are far better than we might expect

[1] Paton-Hicks, Inscriptions of Cos (Oxford 1891), No. 1.15, 38.16, 43 b 7. Other testimonia for the cult are collected by Weinreich, art. "Zwölfgötter," Roscher's Lexicon, 6.789.

[2] Heilige Gesetze von Kos (Abh. Berl. Ak. 1928), p. 47; reproduced by Weinreich, loc. cit., 790.

[3] Used as a public posting-place for decrees, Herzog, op. cit., No. 8 A 17.

[4] Of course the largest temple at Cos was the property of Asclepius, but he is never in the Twelve Gods (Weinreich, loc. cit. 781.61).

[5] I note only Paton-Hicks 37.20, 26, 29; 401.9; cf. Herzog, op. cit., No. 1.28, for another restoration.

[6] Nilsson, Griech. Feste, 397, note 3; Sittig, Diss. Phil. Hall. 20 (1916) 61 ff.; Headlam on Herodas 7.86–88; Pap. Oxy. 412; Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, 2.506; Paton-Hicks p. 370.

[7] Maiuri, Nuova Silloge etc. (Florence 1925), No. 475.12 (Roman); Herzog, op. cit., No. 5 A 8. From the Coan demes, Maiuri No. 676, Herzog, Koische Forschungen (Leipzig 1899), No. 217, Paton-Hicks Nos. 370, 388, 401.

to find in a divinity who only got into the society of the gods at the time of Hesiod's Theogony (411 ff.). The available evidence points toward including Aphrodite and Hecate as the most likely deities to fill out the number of the Twelve Gods.

Finally, it may be mentioned that Zeus is surely to be included in this group. Radermacher [8] asserted that Zeus could stand outside the group of twelve at Cos, but he based his argument mainly on Herzog's restoration of the inscription Heilige Gesetze (above, note 2) 5 A 18. But Herzog's restoration is a problem. We have no independent testimony to the "priest of Zeus Polieus and the Twelve Gods," to translate his restoration, and the space on the stone is not compelling toward this reading. We might as well restore "the priest of Zeus and of Athena." More evidence on the matter may one day be forthcoming, but meanwhile we should follow the perfectly natural and logical assumption that Zeus was a full member of the Twelve Gods at Cos and that he stood within the group.

MORTIMER HARDIN CHAMBERS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

[8] Sitzb. Oest. Ak. 213 (1931–32) 1.99.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Agapè; Prolégomènes a Une Étude de Théologie Néo-Testamentaire. *Par C. Spicq.* . . Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts, 1955. xii, 227 p. (Studia Hellenistica 10) (Publications Universitaires de Louvain)

The Bent World. [*By*] *J. V. Langmead Casserley.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1955. ix, 286 p.

Die Buecher Koenige; Eine Rhythmische Untersuchung *von D. Arvid Bruno.* Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell [1955] 298 p.

Die Buecher Samuel; Eine Rhythmische Untersuchung *von D. Arvid Bruno.* Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell [1955] 303 p.

Christian Maturity. *By John Donohue, S.J.* New York, P. J. Kenedy & Sons [1955] ix, 214 p.

Correspondance [de] Théodoret de Cyr. I. Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes par Yvan Azéma. . . Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1955. 137 p. (Sources Chrétiennes, No. 40)

Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Number Eight. *Edited by the Committee on Publications, The Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Harvard University, Washington, District of Columbia.* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954. 330 p. plates.

L'Église en État de Mission. [*par*] *Mgr Léon-Joseph Suenens.* . . [Bruges] Desclée de Brouwer [c1955] 208 p.

Der Eigentumsbegriff Als Problem Evangelischer Theologie. [*Von*] *Gottfried Wilh. Locher.* Zuerich, Zwingli-Verlag, 1954. 169 p. (Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und systematischen Theologie, Band 5)

Erkenntnis Gottes Nach Dem Buche Ezechiel; Eine Theologische Studie. *Von Walther Zimmerli.* . . Zuerich, Zwingli-Verlag, 1954. 75 p. (Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 27)

Erniedrigung und Erhoehung Bei Jesus und Seinen Nachfolgern. *Von Eduard Schweizer.* . . Zuerich, Zwingli-Verlag, 1955. 167 p. (Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 28)

Gregorii Ariminensis O.E.S.A. Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarium. (Reprint of the 1522 Edition). St. Bonaventure, N. Y., Franciscan Institute, 1955. v.p. (Franciscan Institute Publications. Text Series No. 7)

The Indwelling of the Trinity; a Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. *By Francis L. B. Cunningham.* . . Dubuque, Priory Press, 1955. xvii, 414 p. Bibliography: p. 378–394.

Jesus and the First Three Gospels; an Introduction to the Synoptic Tradition. [*By*] *Walter E. Bundy.* . . Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1955. xxiii, 598 p.

The Life to Live. *By Frederick M. Meek.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1955. xi, 151 p.

Nuove Ricerche Storiche Sul Giansenismo; Studi Presentati nella Sezione di Storia Ecclesiastica del Congresso Internazionale per il IV Centenario della Pontificia Università Gregoriana 13–17 Ottobre 1953. Romae, Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1954. 310 p. (Analecta Gregoriana. Vol. LXXI. Series Facultatis Historiae Ecclesiasticae. Sectio A(n. 4).

Paleographie Musicale. Tome XVI: L'Antiphonaire du Mont-Renaud; Antiphonaire de la Messe et de L'Office. X^e Siècle. Collection privée. Sólesmes (Sarthe) France, Abbaye Saint Pierre, 1955. Nos. 185–192.

Problemi Scelti di Teologia Contemporanea; Relazioni lette nella Sezione di Teologia del Congresso Internazionale per il IV Centenario dell Pontificia Università Gregoriana 13–17 Ottobre 1953. viii, 468 p. (Analecta Gregoriana. Vol. LXVIII. Series Facultatis Theologicae. Sectio A(n. 11).

"Rhema" Im Neuen Testament Unter Beruecksichtigung Seines Gebrauchs in der Uebrigen Altchristlichen Literatur. Helsinki, [Finnischen Literaturgesellschaft] 1954. 214 p. (Der Begriff "Rhema" im Biblisch-Griechischen; eine Traditionsgeschichtliche und Semasiologische Untersuchung, II.) (Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae. SarJa-Ser. B nide-Tom. 88,[1].)

Religions of the Ancient Near East: Sumero-Akkadian Religious Texts and Ugaritic Epics. *Edited with an Introduction by Isaac Mendelsohn* . . . New York, Liberal Arts Press [c1955] xxix, 284 p. (The Library of Religion, Vol. 4)

Sacerdozio e Regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VII; Studi presentati alla Sezione Storica del Congresso della Pontificia Università Gregoriana 13–17 Ottobre 1953. Roma, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1954. xi, 180 p. (Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, Vol. XVIII, Collectionis nn. 50–57).

The Sensus Plenior of Sacred Scripture; a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of St. Mary's University, Baltimore, Maryland, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology. *By Raymond Edward Brown, S.S., M.A., S.T.L.* Baltimore, Maryland, St. Mary's University, 1955. xii, 161 p.

Studi Sulla Chiesa Antica e Sull' Umanesimo; Studi Presentati nella Sezione di Storia Ecclesiastica del Congresso Internazionale per il IV Centenario della Pontificia Università Gregoriana 13–17 Ottobre 1953. Romae, Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1954. xi, 352 p. (Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. LXX. Series Facultatis Historiae Ecclesiasticae. Sectio A(n. 3).

The Synagogue and Social Welfare; A Unique Experiment (1907–1953) *by Sidney E. Goldstein.* New York, Published for Stephen Wise Free Synagogue and Hebrew Union College — Jewish Institute of Religion by Bloch Publishing Company, 1955. xix, 376 p.

William Ellery Channing; an Intellectual Portrait *by David P. Edgell.* Boston, Beacon Press [1955] xv, 264 p.